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Recent lawsuits and articles have drawn attention to a growing issue in
intellectual property law, the aggressive and arguably abusive tactics of intellectual
property (“IP”) rights holders. Indeed in the trademark context, some maintain and there
are arguments to support the idea that trademark holders bring these actions as a means of
manipulating the public through direct control of the public’s ability to use language.
Nonetheless, if one supposes for a moment that trademark holders and their counsel are
acting at some level of good faith and are rational, it may be that something else in the
law itself drives this otherwise questionable behavior. This paper argues that the doctrine
of genericism—under which a court may determine a previously valuable mark is or has
become generic, thus losing all trademark status and value—as it is currently applied
forces the trademark holder to police her rights in this extreme manner for fear of losing
her mark.
Specifically, this paper investigates the theoretical and historical evolution of the
doctrine and posits that current genericism doctrine has strayed far from its roots, which
are in consumer understanding in the marketplace and enhancing competition, and now
concerns itself with an inappropriate property type of analysis that places great weight on
non-commercial and/or non-competitive trademark use contexts (e.g., dictionary entries,
newspapers, noncompetitive third-party uses, etc.). This focus leads to inefficient results,
i.e., trademark holders engaging in extensive advertising, letter campaigns, and litigation
to try to protect the mark and prevent it from being deemed generic.
As such this paper argues that the doctrine should be re-anchored to focus on the
mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer in commercial contexts. Refocusing genericism on consumer contexts rather than non-consumer, expressive contexts
will allow the analysis to embrace a more sophisticated, broad understanding of
trademarks. This approach recognizes a term’s ability to perform more than one function
in language depending on the user of the term and the context of the term’s use (i.e.,
commercial and non-commercial). In addition, this revised understanding of genericism
would undermine trademark holders’ ability to claim the need to engage in what would
otherwise be frivolous and/or abusive enforcement strategies, because they could no
longer hang their collective hat on the excuse that they were required to do so to avoid
falling victim to genericism. In short, this retooling of the doctrine would allow
trademark owners to enjoy the full benefits of the source identifying functions of their
marks while at the same time creating a space in which the public may enjoy full use of
the terms without fear of reprisal by mark owners.
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Introduction
Do you Yahoo!? Did you Google someone or something today? Use a Kleenex?
If so, how did you understand the terms Yahoo!, Google, or Kleenex? Did they mean a
general experience or product or did they signify a specific product or service? Maybe
the significance depended on the context in which you used the term. If you were buying
tissue, you may have meant specifically Kleenex,1 or you may have used the term to
mean any tissue, or you may have meant the term to be both. That is, you may have
thought, “I need Kleenex” (substituting the term for tissue), reached the aisle with tissues,
and then discerned between Kleenex tissue and its competitors because at that point—the
commercial point—the brand2 mattered to you.
Insofar as you used any of the terms in a general way to indicate a product or
service class rather than a specific product or service, one group would be quite upset.
That group is the trademark holders, because such uses may lead to a finding that the
†
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1
Note that, when using Microsoft Word, typing “kleenex” with a lower case “k” causes the autocorrect
function to capitalize the word to signify that it is a proper noun.
2
The terms “trademark,” “mark,” and “brand” are used interchangeably throughout this article. Although
almost anything may function as a trademark (e.g., color, smell, sound), this article focuses on word marks
and the way they function as part of language. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514
U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that the green and gold color of dry cleaning press pads was a protectable
trademark); Id. at 162 (noting the registration of NBC’s three chimes as a trademark); In re Clarke, 17
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B 1990) (allowing registration of plumeria blossom-fragranced thread); In
re General Electric Broadcasting Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (ringing made by "ship's bell
clock" registrable with acquired distinctiveness).
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trademark has become generic. Once a term is deemed generic, that is, the general term
used to refer to a product or service category, the formerly valuable mark loses its ability
to function as a trademark. When that happens, the mark, which may have been highly
valuable to the trademark holder, becomes essentially worthless.
As one can imagine, trademark holders who invest considerable sums of money in
developing and protecting their marks do not wish to find their marks deemed generic.
Rather, a company’s marketing goal is to build brand dominance to the point of ubiquity,
so that the brand is the first thing on a consumer’s mind when considering a purchase of a
particular type of good.3 Further, the brand identifies the company and/or its products for
the consumer, and ideally conveys (hopefully positive) information as well. Put
differently, the trademark holder’s goal is to build and maintain consumer awareness of
the trademark so that consumers come to see the trademark as a sign of “consistent
source and quality.”4 Indeed, one of the touchstones of trademark law is the idea that
“[t]he value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by the information
or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand. . . .”5
Thus, in this paper we address the related concepts of genericism and genericide.
We use the term “genericism” to refer to the over-arching doctrine applied by courts to
determine whether a word or term should be deemed “generic” and hence incapable of

3

On brand building and its importance in general, see WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND
(2005); see also MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT NEW
LUXURY GOODS AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM (2005).
4
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 789 (1997).
5
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 270 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective]; accord
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163-64 ("[T]rademark law. . . reduces the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item
with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or
disliked) in the past.") (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted.
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functioning as a trademark. Genericide is really a subset of genericism and refers to the
process by which a mark that was once highly valuable and unquestionably protectable
loses all trademark status and value. As such, genericism encompasses genericide but
also covers broader issues related to this area of trademark law. Both doctrines have
flaws that lead to incoherence, inefficiencies, and undesirable behaviors.
Under current trademark doctrine a business person may choose an arguably
descriptive mark—one which describes the attributes of the product or service to which it
is attached—and invest in her mark so that it acquires secondary meaning. When that
occurs the term is considered source identifying and thus can be a trademark. Yet under
current genericism doctrine, the same mark holder may discover that the mark is
considered “generic” and hence invalid only after creating goodwill associated with the
mark.
Business owners who chose arbitrary or fanciful names face an inverse problem.
Arbitrary or fanciful marks such as Xerox or Yahoo! do not need to develop secondary
meaning; such terms are source-identifying at the outset (i.e., inherently distinctive). Still,
that source identifying quality can be lost, if the mark is used in a manner that eliminates
its distinctiveness.6 Thus under the doctrine of genericide mark holders are required to
“police” their marks and failure to do so may lead to a court finding that the sourceidentifying function of the mark no longer exists.7 However, under the current doctrine
not only uses by competitors in commercial contexts can show that the mark has lost its

6

Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides that “[a] mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen any
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. . . .” 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).
7
Id.; see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Nationalizing Trademarks: A New International Trademark
Jurisprudence?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 740 & n.40 (2004) (discussing trademark policing).
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source-identifying quality; uses by non-competitors in expressive or informative contexts
(such as newspapers or dictionaries) are taken as evidence of the death of the mark. This
approach poses serious problems because it requires (or, at the very least, encourages)
trademark holders to pursue expensive and perhaps harmful if not quixotic strategies,
ranging from letter campaigns to lawsuits, to attempt to control the manner in which
society uses language. If mark holders do not try to prevent these expressive, noncommercial uses, a court may rely on such evidence to show that the mark has morphed
from a valuable intellectual property asset into a communal term with no value as a mark.
These policing efforts by trademark holders may impinge on another important
interest: the public’s ability to use and adapt language as it sees fit.8 Much has been
written about the arguably abusive tactics of trademark holders who aggressively enforce
their rights.9 Indeed, in the trademark context some maintain—and there are arguments
to support—that trademark holders attempt to manipulate the public through direct
control of the public’s ability to use language.10 Those wishing to protect the expressive
aspects of language assert that speech interests should trump a mark holder’s ability to
control and protect her mark from public uses, even uses that under current doctrine
could lead to the term losing its value as a mark.11

8

See notes 234-245 and accompanying text.
See e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—
Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y.
609 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031
(2005).
10
See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 406-410 (1990) (tracing the shift to a pure property approach to
trademark rights and noting the way in which this shift limits the potential for expressive use of
trademarks); Greene, supra note 9 (suggesting limitations to curb abusive trademark litigation practices).
11
See Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 418-19 (arguing that when a term is required for expressive needs and no
other term is available that use must be allowed).
9
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We argue that these explanations, at best, do not tell the whole story. If we are to
address the problems caused by current genericism doctrine and its apparently attendant
abusive trademark litigation, we should understand the issue from both sides of the fence:
First, what is the mark holder’s perspective regarding trademark protections? Second,
what is the history of and rationale behind genericism doctrine? Third, when must speech
interests (if ever) trump a mark holder’s ability to control and protect her mark? By
investigating these areas it appears that genericism doctrine may be redeemable such that
both trademark and speech interests may be satisfied.
Specifically, this paper posits that current methods for determining whether a term
is generic—a line-drawing process that attempts to classify words and terms
etymologically as either a “genus” (generic) or a “species” (a protectable trademark)12—
grant undue weight to non-commercial and/or non-competitive trademark use contexts
(e.g., dictionary entries and newspapers)13 and thus stray far from trademark’s roots in
source identification analysis. Moreover, the current doctrine fails to examine how
affording the term trademark status will impact competition, to the detriment of both
consumers and potential mark holders. This approach causes incoherence and uncertainty
leading to inefficiencies.
As such we contend that the genericism doctrine should be re-anchored to focus on
the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer in commercial contexts.
By refocusing the genericism question on consumer contexts rather than non-consumer
contexts the doctrine may better reflect a term’s ability to perform more than one function
in language, depending on the user of the term and the context of the term’s use. In

12
13

See notes 164-167 and accompanying text, infra.
These issues are discussed in Section II, infra.
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addition, refocusing the doctrine on the mark’s ability to act as a source-identifier in a
commercial context—while considering the effect of trademark protection on
competition—would provide businesspeople with greater clarity regarding what
constitutes a protectable mark and what types of usage may contribute to a mark’s
demise. Furthermore, this approach allows and encourages mark holders to expend
resources on developing goodwill and the source-identifying properties of their marks
rather than wasting resources on currently required yet largely impotent campaigns to
protect their marks from what should be considered fair use. Finally, this revised
understanding of genericism would undermine trademark holders’ ability to claim the
need to engage in what would otherwise be frivolous and/or abusive enforcement
strategies, because they could no longer hang their collective hat on the excuse that they
were required to do so to avoid falling victim to genericide. As such, this retooling of the
doctrine allows trademark holders to enjoy the full benefits of the source-identifying
functions of their marks, while creating a space in which the public may enjoy full use of
the terms without fear of reprisal by mark holders.
Section I of this article explains the clash of interests that underlie the genericism
conundrum. It begins with an explanation of trademark value from a business
perspective, as supported by the law and economics understanding of trademark law.
Next, the section explains and then investigates the language and speech theories of how
people use trademarks and how trademarks function expressively, beyond the
commercial context. Section II provides some fundamentals of trademark taxonomy and
traces the evolution of the genericism doctrine. Section III examines the way in which the
doctrine currently operates and identifies the ways in which the doctrine is inefficient
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and/or ineffectual in promoting the core purposes of trademark law. Section IV sets forth
a modest proposal for the reform of the doctrine, focusing on (1) a putative trademark’s
ability to function as a source-identifier in the relevant marketplace, and (2) the
competitive effect of extending trademark protection.

I. Why Genericism Matters

This section begins by first presenting why trademarks (AKA brands) are so
important to business. From there the section examines the theoretical underpinnings of
trademark law. By analyzing the law and economics, free speech, and linguistic theories
related to trademarks, this section seeks to show how—rather than conflicting—these
theoretical presentations provide a framework for unraveling the problems currently seen
in the genericism doctrine.

A. The Power of the Brand

In the debate regarding the extent of trademark holders’ rights versus the public’s
need to use language freely, the trademark holders’ perspective can be lost. Ignoring this
story fails to appreciate the real interests that mark holders and the economy have in
protecting marks. While some argue—and certain trademark holders’ behaviors support
the idea—that mark holders engage in abusive rights enforcement,14 analysis of the
problem must not focus solely on the negative aspects of holding and enforcing a
trademark. To do so presupposes bad faith on the trademark holder’s part and requires
14

See generally Greene, supra note 9.
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one to believe that mark holders and their attorneys engage in overly aggressive
enforcement strategies merely to vex the public and to commandeer language. A
comprehensive critique of genericism and genericide must recognize that trademarks are
powerful tools in a company’s economic arsenal.15 Indeed, much of a company’s value
and potential for long-term growth can be traced to its brand value.16 These facts explain
some of trademark holders’ behaviors and why the law must protect the value of
trademarks.
Trademarks and brands play an important role in a company’s ability to generate
capital. Marketing theorists opine that “[p]erhaps the most distinctive skill of
professional marketers is their ability to create, maintain, protect, and enhance brands. ”17
Marketers typically define “brand equity” as “the price premium the brand commands
times the extra volume it moves over an average brand.”18 The value of a brand is
expressed when a company realizes a net worth greater than its tangible asset value.19
Brands can be so powerful that some companies employ a strategy of purchasing
other companies merely to build a brand portfolio, as evidenced by Nestle’s $4.5 billion

15

See generally KLAUS JENNWEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGYBRANDS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (2005) (presenting a theory of how
brand-equity and technology assets interact to allow companies to extract value from initial technological
investments).
16
See Warren E. Buffet, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 173 (1997) (selected, arranged, and introduced by Lawrence E. Cunningham).
17
PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 404 (2000). Kotler defines a brand as “a name, trademark,
logo, or other symbol.” Id.
18
Id. at 405. Valuation of a brand, however, is subjective at best, as evidenced by the numerous other brand
valuation methods used in the marketing industry. A direct measure approach adds up the investment of
capital into the brand and adjusts for inflation. Jacques Chevron, Valuing Brands, on Paper and in Truth,
BRANDWEEK, Jan. 17, 2000, at 24. While this method is perhaps the easiest, it penalizes brands that do not
heavily advertise. The brand awareness method contrasts the percentage of targeted customers who have
tried the product versus customers that regularly purchase the product. Comparing this figure to the overall
advertising budget results in a more conservative valuation of the brand than any other method. Id.
19
For an extended investigation of the relationship between brand-equity and intangible assets, see
generally JENNWEIN, supra note 15.
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purchase of Rowntree, a price that was five times Rowntree’s book value.20 Warren
Buffet explains his company’s purchase of See’s Candy for $25 million—despite a book
value of $8 million—as based on See’s Candy’s economic goodwill; in other words, the
$17 million premium was for the “excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired.”21 As
Buffet explains:
Relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax
on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s. . . . It was not the fair market value
of the inventories, receivable or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of
return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive
favorable reputation with consumers based on countless pleasant experiences that
they have had with both product and personnel.22
The “goodwill” described by Buffet above—the “pervasive favorable reputation
with consumers based on countless pleasant experiences that they have had with both
product and personnel”—demonstrates in part why brands may be so highly valued. It
does not, however, tell the entire story. Marketers also encourage the public to build
identities and form emotional bonds with brands: “A brand can also create a connection
by serving as a ‘badge,’ or an outward sign that tells the world something about the buyer
or the user.”23 Similarly, Professor Barton Beebe writes that “consumers consume

20

KOTLER, supra note 17, at 405.
See Buffet, supra note 16, at 172-73.
22
See id. at 173 (emphasis added). Other examples of payment for brand-equity include when U.K.-based
GrandMet acquired Pillsbury, likely paying just short of $1 billion, or 88% of the purchase price, to acquire
the Pillsbury brands, including Green Giant, Old El Paso, and Haagen-Dazs; and BMW’s purchase of the
Rolls-Royce brand name from Volkswagen for $65 million. Chevron, supra note 18, at 24; see also
William Diem, BMW Gains Rolls-Royce Brand After All, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, August 3, 1998, at 25. More
recently, communications giant SBC paid $16 billion to keep the AT&T brand when the two companies
merged, because AT&T as a brand is “deeply rooted in the American consumer psyche”. Jon Britton,
former SBC spokesman, has stated that the new advertising campaign to push the AT&T brand would be
the largest in the history of either company. SBC Starting All Over with the Name Game, THE SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 2005, at C1.
23
See MCEWEN, supra note 3, at 36. McEwen lists five ways this symbolic function can manifest itself: as
a sign of prestige (e.g., the status of wearing a Rolex watch), personal quality (e.g., youth for Pepsi or
competitive excellence in Nike), membership (e.g., the club-like aspect of owning a Harley-Davidson
motorcycle), memory trigger (e.g., associating a food brand with family tradition), and/or self-completion
(e.g., brands consumers see as signs of self-completion such as Marlboro as a sign of being a rugged man
21
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trademarks to signal status .… The culture industries. . . have long sold trademarks as
commodities in their own right.”24
The power of brands to serve a symbolic, expressive function translates into
market value. Brands can become symbols by which people define and express
themselves, such that people spend money far beyond the cost of the utility of the good to
reinforce that identity or have that means of expression.25 Professor Beebe argues that
“[e]ntire areas of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of rules
designed to facilitate the commodification—indeed, the ‘industrial production’—of social
distinction.”26 Although this trend may be viewed as both inefficient and exploitative of
the consumer, others have argued that the pervasive use of brands not only benefits the
brand holder, but also serves a valuable community-building function in modern
society.27

or L’Oreal as sign of being worth spending extra for oneself). Id. at 36-38. For an excellent account of
how Nike built its brand, see generally DONALD KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT IN THE CORPORATE
WORLD (1994).
24
Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004).
25
See SILVERSTEIN & FISKE, supra note 3. Some argue that such expenditures are not irrational because,
when trademarks function properly, a consumer may wish to expend greater resources on a given brand
despite knowing that it is identical to a competitor’s cheaper good in constituent materials, because the
consumer wishes to ensure that the materials are assembled in a certain way that assures some specific type
of quality. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK
LAW 174 [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW]; see also
Shahar Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting ‘Irrational Beliefs’, Law and
Technology Scholarship (March 21, 2006) (Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Paper No. 19;
available at the eScholarship Repository, University of California, http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/19),
at 13-19.
26
Beebe, supra note 24, at 624.
27
Friedman writes that “the value-expressive dimension of brand names suggests that brand name usage
performs a valuable social function by engendering feelings of community on the part of those who share
brand identification. This facilitation of group affiliation seems especially important in light of the loss of
community that is said to commonly accompany life in complex societies such as contemporary America.”
Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage in Popular
American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 927, 936 (1985); see also
Dilbary, supra note 25 (arguing that “Snobbery”— consumer brand preference— benefits both consumers
and producers and is economically efficient). For an investigation of the reciprocal nature of language,
culture, and society, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984).
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For all of these reasons trademarks or brands may be extremely valuable—in fact,
a company’s brand may be its most valuable asset. Business Week’s annual global brand
report ranks the top one hundred global brands by dollar value, estimating the amount the
brand is likely to earn in the future.28 Since Business Week first published the Global
Brand Scoreboard in 2001, the three top-ranked brands have remained steady: CocaCola, Microsoft and IBM, valued at $67.5 billion, $59.9 billion and $53.3 billion,
respectively.29
Although the above figures are based in part on subjective factors and therefore
their accuracy is open to debate,30 they undoubtedly demonstrate that companies have a
lot to lose when it comes to their brands—particularly the most famous31 ones. Not
surprisingly, companies vigorously seek to protect these assets. In a corporate setting
failure to pursue any and all possible threats to a brand would arguably be a breach of
fiduciary duty. For if a brand is an intangible asset, like any asset it can drop in value just
as easily as it can rise. Genericide poses the ultimate threat, as it can reduce the value of
the billion-dollar mark to zero.

B. The Traditional Law and Economics Explanation of Brand Value
28

Global Brands, BUSINESS WEEK, July 2005, at 90.
Id.
30
Branding consultant Interbrand (which provides data for Business Week’s annual report) estimates brand
value by projecting five years of earnings and sales, minus operating costs, taxes and charges for the capital
employed. The strength of the brand is also assessed by factoring market leadership, stability, and global
reach. Id. Other brand valuation methodologies exist, which may reach significantly different conclusions
regarding the value of identical brands. See, e.g., John Willman, Valued Measure of Success: Managing
brands is no easy task but a new ranking brings science to a black art, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at 1
(unveiling BrandZ Top 100, prepared by Millard Brown Optimor, which values IBM brand at $36.1 billion,
compared to Interbrand IBM valuation of $53.4 billion; noting other differences as well); see also note 18,
supra.
31
“Famous” is a term of art in trademark dilution law. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)—
which provides broad protection of trademarks against “diluting” uses that do not cause a likelihood of
consumer confusion—protects only “famous” trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A-H). See notes 246257 and accompanying text, infra, discussing the link between the dilution and genericide doctrines.
29
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The law and economics movement offers one explanation for why trademarks
may be so highly valued, at least when they function efficiently. Given that the courts
have largely adopted the law and economics analysis of trademarks as the primary
justification for their existence, we turn here to a brief description of the traditional
doctrine.
The classic economic rationale behind trademark law is that trademarks should be
protected because they are economically efficient; trademarks help to minimize
consumers’ search costs, the pre-purchase analysis a consumer performs to make her
purchase decision.32 William Landes and Richard Posner set forth the idea as follows:
“[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need
not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is
a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I
enjoyed earlier.’”33 These principles relate to a trademark’s function as a sourceidentifier.34

32

Ralph Folsom & Larry Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1335 (1980); accord,
Stephen Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 89 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of
Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 729-30 (2004).
33
Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, supra note 5, at 268-270; see also Folsom
& Teply, supra note 32, at 1336 ( “A properly functioning trademark provides a short-hand means of
associating currently tendered products with past or anticipated experiences and thereby eliminates the need
to make repeated searches for nonprice information.”).
34
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; accord 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2005) (“to become a ‘trademark’ is to identify the source of one seller's goods
and distinguish that source from other sources”). Of course, a mark’s capacity for source identification is
not immutable. As companies are bought and sold, as product information changes, and as products are
altered, consumers’ understanding of brands will change based on one or a combination of these sorts of
events. Some commentators argue, based on this potential (or arguably inherent) instability, that the
economic value of trademarks to the consumer has been seriously overstated. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note
32, at 730-32; see also Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment ‘with Goodwill’: A Concept Whose Time Has
Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 830-31 (2005) (arguing that trademarks should be transferable “with or without
goodwill,” in part because trademark owners have always had the ability to change the quality or nature of
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The United States Supreme Court has also articulated this reasoning:
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark holder has something of value.35
Not surprisingly, the law and economics presentation of trademarks accords with
the valuation of brands in business discussed above. As stated by Warren Buffet, brands
have the ability to generate tremendous value for a company because they are “intangible
assets, particularly consisting of a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based
on countless pleasant experiences that they have had with both product and personnel.”36
This economic theory manifests itself via a typical trip to the grocery store. For
example, assume one enters the supermarket for the purpose of buying teriyaki sauce. If
the shopper has sampled or researched a particular brand of sauce before, he gains certain
information about the brand, e.g., that Soy Vay® teriyaki sauce has the distinct taste of
ginger. Here, the trademark informs the buyer about the class of goods—teriyaki
sauces—and tells the buyer that, when choosing among teriyaki sauces, he can pick
specific ones with specific characteristics. If he likes ginger, he may choose Soy Vay®;
if he hates ginger, he may avoid it. In either case, as the purveyor of the product educates
the buyer about the product’s traits or the buyer performs some initial research, the buyer
gains the benefit of being able to go to a store and buy the right sauce with the

their products at will); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (further
critiquing the economic justification for trademark law).
35
Misawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
36
Buffet, supra note 16, at 173; see also Calboli, supra note 34, at 799-814 (defining and discussing the
concept of “goodwill” associated with a trademark).
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characteristics she wants without having to check the label or perform new research each
time she buys the sauce.
Trademark infringement destroys a mark’s ability to reduce consumer search
costs and is therefore inefficient, as well as potentially harmful to both the consumer and
the trademark holder. Infringement occurs when a competitor copies the relevant mark
so that he can trick the consumer into buying his product, when the consumer was
seeking out the trademark holder’s goods or services. In other words, if a trademark is
functioning properly as a source-identifier and the consumer has developed an affection
for the product to which it is attached (i.e., the product has attained goodwill),
competitors may be tempted to appropriate that goodwill by selling their own products
under the same or a confusingly similar trademark.37 When this type of free-riding
occurs, trademark law applies a likelihood of confusion analysis to determine whether the
consumer will be deceived by the practice.38 Accordingly, though the mark holder
enforces her rights against the free-rider, it is primarily the consumer who is protected.39
Again, a trip to the supermarket illustrates the concept. If I like Soy Vay®
teriyaki sauce and I am “tricked” into buying a competitor’s inferior sauce because the
competitor has placed a confusingly similar “Soy Vey” label on its bottle, both I and the
maker of the “real” Soy Vay® have been injured via trademark infringement. If the

37

As Landes and Posner state, “The benefits of trademarks in lowering search costs presuppose legal
protection because the cost of duplicating someone else’s trademark is small and the incentive to incur this
cost in the absence of legal impediments will be greater the stronger the trademark.” LANDES & POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 168; see also Klieger, supra note 4, at
789; but see Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031-32 (noting that the property label for trademarks and the
“rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property” “are misguided” as they allow for intellectual property right
holders to “fully internalize the benefits of their creativity [which] will inevitably get the balance [between
inventors’/ creators’ control and competition] wrong.”).
38
See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. SleekCraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing factors considered
by the courts in analyzing likelihood of confusion).
39
Klieger, supra note 4, at 793-94.
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competitor’s copying does not result in a “likelihood of confusion” on my part, however,
there is no infringement and, absent dilution,40 no actionable injury.

C. Limitations on the Scope of Protection Afforded to Trademarks

Traditionally, trademarks—unlike their cousins patents and copyrights—have
enjoyed only limited protection outside the likelihood of confusion context. As explained
above, in theory at least, uses of trademarks that do not infringe should not impinge on
the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier and therefore are not inefficient. Yet as
trademarks (AKA brands) have become more and more valuable as corporate assets,41
trademark holders have understandably pushed at the boundaries of trademark law and
succeeded in expanding its scope, arguably reducing efficiency and hindering
competition.
In most contexts, intellectual property law aims to incentivize potential holders of
intellectual property rights to develop intellectual property by giving “as little protection
as possible consistent with encouraging innovation.”42 To that end, copyright and patent
law grant limited monopolies to allow the rights holder to exploit the value of the

40

Both the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) and state anti-dilution laws protect “famous” or highly
distinctive marks against dilution, even in the absence of likelihood of confusion. See notes 248-254 and
accompanying text, infra. The dilution doctrine has greatly expanded the scope of trademark protection, at
least for the strongest marks, much to the dismay of many commentators. See generally Klieger, supra
note 4; but cf. Dilbary, supra note 25 (arguing that anti-dilution laws benefit both producers and consumers
because “contamination” of a mark destroys its value to the consumer).
41
See notes 20-30 and accompanying text, supra.
42
Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031; see also LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK
LAW, supra note 25, at 8 (describing how property rights in physical items are aimed towards managing
natural scarcity and price concerns, whereas intellectual property creates scarcity “which could not
otherwise be maintained”) (citations omitted).
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creation for a limited period of time.43 That system essentially and temporarily grants
rights in gross—that is, the holder of the intellectual property has exclusive control over
it and generates capital based on that control for a finite period of time.44 As to copyright
and patent law, this notion is enshrined in the Constitution, which empowers Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”45 In contrast, trademark law has no explicit Constitutional mandate but
instead emerged from the common law tort of unfair competition.46 Also in contrast to
copyrights and patents, trademarks do not expire after a set period of time, but instead
endure so long as the mark holder continues to use the mark, potentially in perpetuity.47
As a result, a fundamental tenet of trademark law has always been that, unlike copyrights
and patents, trademarks are not held “in gross” and therefore the trademark holder’s right
to prohibit others’ use of the mark is limited to circumstances in which that use harms
consumers, as determined via the “likelihood of confusion” standard.48

43

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Lemley, supra note 9, at 1042; cf. David W. Barnes, A New Economics
of Trademarks (April 1, 2006) (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 886045; available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=886045) (arguing that the differences between copyrights and patents on the one
hand and trademarks on the other are not as stark as is often presented, but rather that, like copyrights and
patents, trademarks are public goods with non-rivalrous characteristics and must be understood as such “to
supply an optimal amount of information about products and their sources”).
44
LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 8.
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
46
LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 166.
47
The Lanham Act provides that owner of a federally-registered trademark may maintain that registration
by filing a renewal application (attesting to continued use) and paying a specified fee every ten years.
There is no limit on the number of times the mark owner may renew his trademark registration. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1058, 1059 (2005) (Lanham Act §§ 8, 9).
48
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a trade-mark confers
no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of
one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol—a commercial signature—upon the
merchandise or package in which it is sold.”); accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
413-14 (1916).
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As the rights of trademark holders have expanded, however, this fundamental
tenet has eroded. Put simply, trademark holders have relied upon a pure property
conception of their rights to expand their dominion over those rights.49 This development
poses serious problems because it strikes at the heart of the balance between intellectual
property rights, competition, and expression that the law should respect and protect. To
understand what is at stake when we refer to “expression,” we now turn to an
examination of the expressive capacity of trademarks.

D. Trademarks’ Capacity for Expressive Use
As explained above, trademarks are often considered and treated as corporate
assets—often extremely valuable ones—that primarily serve to act as source identifiers
for the goods or services to which they are attached. However, in confronting the
genericism conundrum, we must also take into account trademarks’ ability to function
beyond this dimension. Professor Barton Beebe contends that the law and economics
approach “cannot explain, predict, or justify certain outcomes in [trademark] law, nor can
it articulate the need for necessary reforms.”50 According to Beebe, this failing occurs in
part because trademarks are “a semiotic doctrine elaborating the principles of sign
systems, of language. If there is a ‘language of commodities,’ then trademark doctrine is
49

Many commentators have bemoaned this trend in trademark law. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at
406-410 (tracing the shift to a pure property approach to trademark rights and noting the way in which this
shift limits the potential for expressive use of trademarks); Lemley, supra note 9, at 1032 (arguing that use
of “[t]he rhetoric of real property, with its condemnation of ‘free riding’ by those who imitate or compete
with intellectual property owners,” has resulted in “a legal regime for intellectual property. . . in which
courts seek out and punish virtually any use of an intellectual property right by another”); but see Robert G.
Bone, Enforcement Cost and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099 (2004) (examining trademark law
and criticisms of its expansion and arguing that the law’s apparent inconsistencies may best be understood
as a way to address over- or under-enforcement of trademark rights and related costs).
50
See Beebe, supra note 24, at 624 (arguing that law and economics cannot explain the “concepts of
trademark ‘distinctiveness’ and trademark ‘dilution.’”).
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its grammar, and this grammar must be understood not simply in economic, but also in
linguistic terms.”51
Although corporations construct trademarks either by inventing words or
investing common words with commercial meaning, the public plays an important role in
accepting those meanings and the public may—as it may with all language—manipulate
terms and endow them with additional meaning.52 Judge Kozinski has explained the
phenomenon as follows:
[T]rademarks [may] transcend their identifying purpose. Some trademarks enter
our public discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary. . . .
Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to
our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes
a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.53
Thus, we may find a trademarked word so pervasive and useful that we begin to use it in
noncommercial contexts and indeed not as a trademark at all. We may incorporate a
trademarked term into our everyday language, either through speech or writing, as a way
to convey more than the trademark meaning of the term.54 In short, we may use a
trademark “expressively.”

51

Id. at 624.
See generally id. (applying semiotic theory to trademark law to explain the way in which trademarks
have both source distinctive and differential distinctive properties and the rise of the differential
understanding as related to the commoditization of trademarks).
53
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
54
In artistic contexts, expressive uses entail incorporating a trademark into a painting, sculpture, etc. These
uses fall under a different yet related issue of the incorporation of a trademark into art and whether a given
use is protected under First Amendment principles. See, e.g.,Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (artistic works incorporating and transforming Mattel’s Barbie
doll constituted parodic speech protected by the First Amendment).
52
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Expressive uses of trademarks are pervasive in contemporary culture. For
example, we may ask for a Kleenex when we mean any facial tissue. We may tell
someone to “just put a Band-Aid on the problem” as a way of saying, “Use a quick fix.”55
Moreover, the way in which the public uses words—including trademarks—is constantly
changing. “[N]ew words and expressions” may be viewed as “natural concomitants of
social change that remain as long as people find them useful.”56 In other words, language
is innovative and the public will adopt or drop words at will and as necessary.57
Examples of the evolutionary nature of language abound. When Xerox was the
dominant if not the only maker of a copying machine, we might have “Xeroxed” a
document instead of photocopying it. In the 1980s and 1990s, the public may have
primarily used the term “Walkman” to mean any portable audio cassette player; yet now
that audio cassette players have been superseded by mp3 players, “Walkman” may be
more commonly used to refer to the original Sony device. Today, a person may say
“iPod” to mean any mp3 player or to mean only the mp3 player sold by Apple, Inc.—all
depending on who the speaker is and the context in which he uses the term.
As the above examples demonstrate, trademarks function differently for different
people in different contexts and are capable of different yet simultaneous uses. The law
and economics literature offers a way to describe this phenomenon. Professors Folsom
and Teply characterize trademarks that behave in this manner as hybrid terms. Such terms
“perform a variety of informational functions—ranging from the provision of pure
55

Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (“How else do you say that something's ‘the Rolls Royce of its class’? What
else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid?”).
56
Friedman, supra note 27, at 936; accord Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing:
Genericide or Language Right?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD 259 (Lide Buranen and Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) .
57
Clankie, supra note 56, at 262 (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general,
unmanageable.”).
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commercial or source-related information to the provision of pure generic or productcategory information—at the same time.”58 Based on this understanding Folsom and
Teply identify “three types of consumers, each perceiving the significance of a hybrid
trademarked generic word differently”:
(1) those who are unaware of any source significance for the mark and who use
the word as a product-category word, thereby facing added search or transaction
costs;
(2) those who are aware of the source and nonprice significance of the mark and
who do not perceive, or use, the word as a product-category word; and
(3) those who know that the mark has source significance, but who also use it in a
product-category sense, and thereby may suffer increased search costs.59
Folsom and Teply illustrate how the economic justification for trademarks based
on their capacity to act as source identifiers is congruent with their concurrent capacity
for expressive use. At one end of the spectrum, users may afford a term no trademark
significance because they interpret it as the name of a product category. For these users,
the term is generic and hence useless as a source identifier. It is inefficient to treat truly
generic terms as trademarks, because they do not act as source identifiers and hence
would increase consumer search costs if given trademark protection. At the opposite end
of the spectrum are users who regard the term only as a trademark and for whom it
always functions as a source identifier. For these consumers the mark is optimally
efficient; its protection as a trademark decreases consumer search costs. In the middle
are those who afford the term both trademark significance and non-trademark
significance, complicating any attempt to analyze the impact on search costs and hence to
determine the point at which trademark protection of the term becomes inefficient. In

58
59

Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1339.
Id. at 1340.
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this part of the spectrum people use a term as a trademark or expressively depending on
the context. In truth, many if not the majority of “famous” trademarks fall into this
middle spectrum.
As discussed above, many brands function as both mega-valuable corporate assets
and as invaluable expressive elements of language.60 At the core of this tension are the
questions of whether trademarks are diminished by uses other than as trademarks or
whether the law should force users to use terms in non-hybrid manners at the cost of
losing the expressive dimension of the terms.61 Trademarks consist of words that
symbolize a product and identify source, but once created, consumer upon consumer may
use the trademark without the trademark holder having to produce anything new; in short
trademarks, like ideas, need only be created once and as such seem to be nonrival goods
with infinite capacity:
An idea only needs to be created once to satisfy consumer demand while an apple
must be produced for each consumer. Essentially, this means that the marginal
costs of allowing an additional person to use an idea are zero. Most economists
accept that it is efficient to maximize access to, and consequently consumption of,
an existing nonrival good because generally there is only an upside; additional
private benefits come at no additional cost. Ideas, like other nonrival goods, have
infinite capacity.62

60

Accord Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 400-01 (noting the way in which Barbie can mean the doll itself and
an image of a pretty but vapid woman); cf. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK
LAW, supra note 25, at 168-69 (examining economics of language and noting, “The importance of
trademarks to language is only modest, however, because the contribution they make to the language is
mainly a byproduct of the contribution the products they designate make to the world of things.”).
61
See generally Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
62
Id. at 946; see generally Barnes, supra note 43 (noting that trademarks have been thought of as private
goods but arguing that in fact trademarks function as public goods). Professor Frischmann explains that
nonrivalry relates to infrastructure and argues that infrastructure resources are “are sharable in the sense
that the resources can be accessed and used by multiple users at the same time” and notes, “Infrastructure
resources vary in their capacity to accommodate multiple users, and this variance in capacity differentiates
nonrival (infinite capacity) resources from partially (non)rival (finite but renewable capacity) resources.”
Frishmann, supra note 61, at 942. Although fully understanding whether trademarks function as
infrastructure or more likely have infrastructure characteristics is beyond the scope of this article, it may be
that trademarks’ hybrid nature makes them partially nonrivalrous which means that “one user's
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Put differently, one could think of the purely nonrival characteristics of a trademark
and consider that, when used as input for expression or commentary, the trademark
generates a public good.63 The question becomes one of whether the expressive user
would pay for the access to the good.64 The problem is that the expressive user is
unlikely to pay for such a use, although society’s interest in having such a use is high.65
We argue that this conflict culminates in the genericism doctrine because, as it operates
today, the doctrine forces the trademark holder to protect her mark via means that
threaten beneficial, expressive uses, if not squash them out of existence.
As such we now turn to a historical perspective of genericism and genericide. This
analysis seeks to unravel how the doctrine evolved and how its current application has
strayed, such that it effectively serves neither the economic nor the expressive interests
described above.

II. The Genericism Conundrum

A. The Trademark Name Game
To understand the problem the genericism doctrine poses, the generic term must
be understood in the context of the five basic classes into which a term may fall when

consumption directly affects another user’s” but “can be managed in a way that avoids rivalrous
consumption.” Id. at 951.
63
See generally Barnes, supra note 43 (detailing the theoretical issues around public goods and market
failures).
64
See id. at 28 (explaining that “Marginal cost pricing fails to provide an allocatively efficient supply of
public goods in a competitive marketplace”).
65
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.L. REV. 944, 975 (2002)
(detailing the problem in copyright context); accord Barnes, supra note 43 (citing Lunney and applying the
insight to trademarks).
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determining its trademark status: arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and
generic.66 A term seeking to function as a trademark receives specific treatment as
determined by the category to which it belongs.67 In general, terms that qualify on the
arbitrary or fanciful end of the spectrum are considered to be the strongest marks meriting
the broadest scope of protection; terms deemed generic receive no trademark protection;
and suggestive or descriptive marks fall in the middle.68 Even though these
classifications are critical in determining whether and to what degree a trademark will be
protected against infringement, courts recognize that it is often exceedingly difficult to
determine the appropriate label for a given term:
These categories, like the tones in a spectrum, tend to blur at the edges and
merge together. The labels are more advisory and definitional, more like
guidelines than pigeon holes. Not surprisingly, they are somewhat
difficult to articulate and apply.69
At the top of the heap lie arbitrary and fanciful marks. These types of marks are
considered inherently distinctive and, therefore, may be registered as trademarks under
the Lanham Act with no proof of acquired secondary meaning.70 Marks are considered

66

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
67
See Entrepreneur Media, Inc., 279 F.3d 1135, 141 (9th Cir. 2002).
68
Id. (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir.1992)); see also
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
69
Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 979 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236
F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 1039; Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.R.I. 1980); rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981) (“One is tempted to compare
the intellectual contortions involved in placing a word or symbol in its ‘proper’ category to the legendary
scholastic pursuit of numbering the angels that can dance on the head of a pin.”); see also Bartow, supra
note 32, at 738 and note 49 (criticizing: “Sorting marks into these malleable categories is performed as a
matter of law, and judges generally accomplish this task by referencing their internal visceral impressions.
This type of subjective contextualizing by courts deciding trademark disputes is seemingly required by
extant legal doctrine and accustoms judges to using intuition, and to make instinctive rather than evidence
driven legal determinations under the Lanham Act.”).
70
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (noting that suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are
entitled to registration without proof of secondary meaning).
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“inherently distinctive” when “their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source
of a product.”71 In other words, due to the nature of the mark, the law presumes that the
mark is functioning as a source identifier. Arbitrary and fanciful marks are also
considered to be the strongest types of marks and, therefore, (somewhat
counterintuitively) the most likely to be infringed.72
Although arbitrary and fanciful marks are often grouped together, they actually
describe two different types of trademarks. Arbitrary marks adapt a common word to an
uncommon setting, such as “apple” for computers or a record label.73 “The identical
word can be generic or arbitrary depending on context; generic if it is the name of the
good or service in common parlance (‘car’ as a textual mark for an automobile), and
arbitrary if it has no logical association whatsoever with the underlying product (‘car’ as
a textual mark for fabric softener).”74 Fanciful marks consist of invented words such as
“Google,” “Kodak,” and “Xerox,” as opposed to common words used in an uncommon
manner.75 “The term ‘fanciful,’ as a classifying concept, is usually applied to words
invented solely for their use as trademarks. When the same legal consequences attach to a

71

Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
The court in Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003), explains that “[i]f a
mark is arbitrary or fanciful, and makes no reference to the nature of the goods it designates, consumers
who see the mark on different objects offered in the marketplace will be likely to assume, because of the
arbitrariness of the choice of mark, that they all come from the same source.”
73
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 n. 6 (noting that the word “Ivory” may be generic as applied
to elephant tusks but arbitrary as applied to soap). Two users of the arbitrary mark “apple” have recently
litigated the rights to this mark. Apple Records first challenged Apple Computer’s use of “Apple” 25 years
ago, settling the matter in 1991 with Apple computers agreeing not to offer music related products.
Recently, Apple Records lost its attack on Apple Computer’s entry into the music business via its iTunes
and iPod offerings. Justice Mann declared Apple computer’s use of “Apple” in this context did not violate
the parties’ earlier agreement. Apple Corps Limited v. Apple Computer Inc., [2006] EWHC 996 (CH),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/apple/aclaC50806opn.html.
74
Bartow, supra note 32, at 742.
75
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.
72
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common word, i.e., when it is applied in an unfamiliar way, the use is called
‘arbitrary.’”76
In the middle of the trademark class spectrum sit suggestive marks. Like arbitrary
and fanciful marks, suggestive marks are considered inherently distinctive and may be
registered as trademarks with no proof of secondary meaning.77 However, unlike an
arbitrary or fanciful mark, a suggestive mark is not a made-up word or a word used in an
arbitrary context; it “suggests” the nature of the good or service to which it is attached. 78
A suggestive mark differs from a descriptive mark in that it does not directly describe the
attributes of the relevant good or service, but rather “requires imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.”79 For example, the name
“Coppertone” does not describe the color of a particular type of suntan lotion, but it does
suggest the intended or hoped-for appearance of the consumer, after using the product.80.
Courts have reasoned that suggestive marks are entitled to greater protection than
descriptive ones, because the competitor’s need to use the suggestive mark—unlike a
descriptive term—is arguably minimal: “The English language has a wealth of synonyms

76

Id.
Id.; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are deemed inherently
distinctive because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product).
78
See, e..g, Tumblebus, Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s finding
that “Tumblebus,” as applied to mobile gymnastics instruction for children, was suggestive); Peaceable
Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Niles,” as applied to stuffed toy camel, found
suggestive); Anhueser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 740 F.2d 631, 641 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court
did not err in finding “LA” for low alcohol beer suggestive rather than descriptive); Citibank, N.A. v.
Citibanc, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Citibank” as applied to a bank found suggestive, but
dissent argues that mark should be considered generic); Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d
666 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court’s finding that “The Money Store,” as applied to money lending
services, was suggestive); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chemical Co., Inc. 589 F.2d 103, 106
(2d Cir. 1978) (“Roach Motel” as applied to insect trap found “at least” suggestive, if not arbitrary);
Douglas Laboratories Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954) (“Copper Tone” for suntan
lotion found suggestive rather than descriptive).
79
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted)).
80
See Douglas Laboratories Corp., 210 F.2d 453 (“Copper Tone” for suntan lotion found suggestive rather
than descriptive).
77
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and related words with which to describe the qualities which manufacturers may wish to
claim for their products and the ingenuity of the public relations profession supplies new
words and slogans as they are needed.”81
A descriptive mark, as the term implies, “conveys an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods” or services to which it is attached.82
For example, the name “Teddy Graham” describes a teddy bear-shaped graham cracker
cookie; therefore, the mark could be considered descriptive of any graham cracker shaped
like a teddy bear. In that sense, descriptive terms travel close to being the general term
for a product or service category (i.e., generic).83 The Lanham Act allows registration of
“merely descriptive” terms such as “Teddy Graham” only when the term has acquired
distinctiveness, or secondary meaning.84 The term “secondary meaning” is itself a bit of
a misnomer. A term is said to have acquired secondary meaning only when its primary
meaning in the minds of the consuming public is that of a source identifier: “[A]s a result
of [the descriptive term’s] use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive [the term]
as a designation that identifies goods [or] services” that are “produced or sponsored by a
particular person.”85 In other words, if the consuming public takes the term “Teddy

81

Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(upholding T.T.A.B. finding that “patents.com,” as applied to software for tracking patent applications and
issued patents, was descriptive); Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1985) (upholding district court finding that “security center,” as applied to business housing private
storage vaults, was descriptive rather than suggestive); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.,
698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding district court finding that “chick-fri” and “fish-fri,” as applied to
coating for fried food, was descriptive rather than suggestive); Spex, Inc. v. The Joy of Spex, Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“spex” found descriptive).
83
In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
84
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (“[N]othing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant
which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”) (Lanham Act § 2(f)).
85
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 13(a),(b) (1995); see also Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 F.2d
at 795 (mark has acquired secondary meaning if it denotes to the consumer “a single thing coming from a
single source”) (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920)); see also Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11 (1982).
82
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Graham” to mean a specific product emanating from a specific source—i.e., it is
functioning as a source identifier—the term can be a trademark. Absent proof of
secondary meaning, a descriptive term cannot be protected as a trademark.86
Regardless of the trademark category in which a term resides, all valid trademarks
must function as source identifiers, with the attendant benefits in efficiency to the
consumer explained above. Descriptive and suggestive marks serve the additional
function of conveying information to the consumer about the products to which they are
attached. From a marketer’s perspective, descriptive and suggestive terms are the most
valuable types of marks, because they educate the consumer about the product, negating
or at least reducing the need to do so through advertising. Soy Vay®, for example, could
be classified as a suggestive mark, as the name alludes to the inclusion of soy sauce in the
product and the attendant taste. If instead the sauce were called SHABAZZ or some
other fanciful name, a consumer looking at the label would have no idea of what was in
the sauce and/or how it tasted. To discover the qualities of the product, the consumer
would have to be informed and/or induced to experiment with the sauce by advertising.
Thus, all trademarks are not created equal and, somewhat ironically, those marks that are
the “strongest” in terms of their inherent distinctiveness (fanciful and arbitrary marks) are
probably the least efficient in reducing consumer search costs.87 Nonetheless, these types
of marks are entitled to the highest degree of protection under both common law and the
Lanham Act.

86

15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (No mark may be registered which is “merely descriptive” of the applicant’s goods).
See Carter, supra note 32, at 770-71. Carter characterizes descriptive and suggestive marks as “cheaper
information economizers” and, hence, more efficient. Carter further points out that, even as to fanciful or
arbitrary marks, some are more desirable than others, as evidenced by the amount of time and money
companies invest in choosing their marks. Id.

87
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Generic words are unprotectable under the Lanham Act88 and the common law
doctrine of unfair competition89 because they do not (or no longer) have the capacity for
source identification. The generic name is incapable of ever becoming a trademark, at
least as to the product with which the generic name is associated.90 “If the primary
significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer,
the trademark is a generic term . . . .”91 For example, if one calls one’s product “apple
peeler” and the product is a device to peel apples, the term is generic and cannot be used
as a trademark. Yet if one’s product is a computer or a record, “apple” is arbitrary and
entitled to the highest trademark protection. In contrast, as was the case with the word
“aspirin,” a mark may begin as fanciful—a trademark class that receives the highest
protection—and then drop to the lowest, unprotected class of terms, generic through the
process of genericide.92

88

See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (“A petition to cancel a registration of a mark. . . may. . . be filed. . . (3) [a]t any
time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for
which it is registered. . . . ”); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’. . . [w]hen any
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. . . . ”); 15
U.S.C. § 1115 (b) (even “incontestable” marks are subject to the defense “that the mark has been
abandoned.by the registrant”).
89
See Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 7-8 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing cases); but
see notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
90
See notes 117 and 188, infra.
91
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in
original; internal citations omitted). See, e.g., Id. (affirming summary judgment on grounds that “Filipino
Yellow Pages,” as applied to phone directory marketed to Filipino-American community, was generic);
Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court grant of
preliminary injunction on grounds that “Shoe Warehouse” and “Warehouse Shoes,” as applied to store
selling large inventory of shoes, was generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561
F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing district court grant of preliminary injunction on grounds that “lite
beer,” as applied to low-calorie beer, was generic); compare Anhueser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
740 F.2d 631, 641 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court did not err in finding “LA” for low alcohol beer suggestive
rather than descriptive); see also Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419
F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment on grounds that “yellow cab” was not generic
as a matter of law); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing
T.T.A.B. finding that “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S” was generic).
92
See notes 136-150 and accompanying text, infra.
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The twin goals of trademark law—economic efficiency and consumer protection—
are not served in the case of generic words and, therefore, they cannot become (or
remain) trademarks. When a word is or becomes generic, in theory that word is or has
become the name of the good or service to which it is attached. For example, if grocery
shoppers called all teriyaki sauces “soy vays,” the name would no longer inform the
consumer about the attributes of one specific sauce. A word that is truly generic signals
only that the good is a member of a particular product class.
For the same reason, granting trademark rights in generic words does nothing to
prevent the consumer from being deceived, in the grocery store or elsewhere. If all
teriyaki sauces are called soy vays, then so long as the label is placed upon a good in the
proper product class, the consumer gets what he pays for when he buys a bottle of soy
vay. Therefore, the consumer receives no benefit from trademark protection of truly
generic words. Perhaps most importantly, generic words do not receive trademark
protection because doing so would substantially harm the trademark holder’s competitors
by preventing them from telling the public the name of the product or service they were
attempting to sell.93 Thus, trademark protection does not apply to generic words or
terms, because such protection would provide no benefit to the consumer and in fact
would substantially harm the consumer by suppressing competition. In addition, the
public as a whole would suffer if truly generic words were allowed to become
trademarks, because the public’s ability to use such words in everyday speech and print
would potentially be abbreviated. For all of these reasons, trademark protections do not
apply to generic words.

93

See Nguyen, supra note 7, at 744; see also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1323.
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B. Following the Path to Genericism: The Evolution of a Doctrine

For the reasons stated above, producers of goods or services typically do not
choose obviously generic names as trademarks. They have no incentive to do so, for (1)
the name can and will be duplicated by competitors (with no legal redress); and (2) for
that reason, it serves no source-identifying purpose. However, many generic names did
not start out that way. They were created as protectable—often even arbitrary or
fanciful—trademarks but evolved into generic words through the process of genericide.
Many words that we use today in common speech have suffered this fate, including
aspirin, brassiere, cola, escalator, lanolin, linoleum, Murphy bed, thermos, and yo-yo.94
Moreover, the line between descriptive and generic words has proved to be an
exceedingly difficult one to draw; therefore, the trademark holder may choose a brand
name that she thinks is descriptive, only to learn later (much to her dismay and financial
detriment) that the term is generic and hence unprotectable.95 The following section
traces the origins of the genericism doctrine in trademark law and critiques the manner in
which it has evolved.

94

See Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, 874 F.2d 95 (2nd Cir. 1981) (Murphy bed);
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Manufacturing Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965) (yo-yo); King Seely
Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2nd Cir. 1963) (thermos); Dixi-Cola Laboratories,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941) (cola); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85
U.S.P.Q. 80 (Comm’r Pat. 1950) (escalator); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y 1921)
(aspirin); Charles R. DeBevoise Co. v. H&W. Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 114, 60 A.D. 407 (1905) (brassiere); Jaffe v.
Evans & Sons, 70 A.D. 186, 75 N.Y.S. 257 (1902) (lanolin); Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch.D. 834
(1878) (linoleum).
95
See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat); Retail Services, Inc., v.
Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d. 535 (4th Cir. 2004) (freebies); Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305
F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2002) (smart power); Miller Brewing Co., v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1981) (lite beer); CES Pub Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2nd Cir. 1975) (consumer
electronics); Bascom Launder Corp. et. al. v. Telecoin Corp. et.al., 264 F. 2d 331 (2nd Cir. 1953)
(launderette); Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2005) (brick oven
pizza); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch and Chemical Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (super
glue).
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1.

The Common Law Roots of Genericism and Genericide

a.

Common law distinctions between trademarks and trade-names

At common law, only “technical trademarks”—what today would be classified as
fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive marks—were protected against trademark infringement.96
Similarly, only technical trademarks were registrable under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
which was intended to codify, not alter, the common law of trademarks.97 The 1905 Act
specified that personal names, geographic terms and terms that were “descriptive of the
goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality of such goods” could not be
registered.98 However, even though these “non-technical trademarks” were excluded
from protection under trademark law, they were still entitled to protection—if the user
could prove they had acquired secondary meaning—as “trade names” under the common
law tort of passing off or unfair competition.99 In fact, even the 1905 Act allowed for
96

See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that “a generic name, or a name merely
descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a
trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection”); Lawrence Manuf’g Co. v. Tennessee
Manuf’g Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891) (same).
97
The Act specified that it did not “prevent, lessen, impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which
any party aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade-mark might have had if . . . this Act had not been
passed.” Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 23, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946).
98
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946).
99
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Maine v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 45 F.2d 309, 310 (1st Cir. 1930)
(because “Standard Oil” and “Standard Oil Company” had acquired secondary meaning, appellee was
entitled to protection against “unfair or fraudulent use” of the name in competition); Computing Scale Co.
v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F. 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902) (when a word “is incapable of becoming
a valid trade-mark. . . yet has by use come to stand for a particular maker or vendor, its use by another in
this secondary sense will be restrained as unfair and fraudulent competition. . . .”); American Waltham
Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) (even though “Waltham” was not a valid
trademark, it had acquired secondary meaning and hence was entitled to protection from unfair
competition); see generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (b) & cmt. b (1938) (trade name has acquired
“secondary meaning” when “a substantial number of present or prospective purchasers understand the
designation, when used in connection with goods, services, or a business, not in its primary lexicographical
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registration of marks that were “in actual and exclusive use as a trademark” for ten years
preceding its date of enactment (February 20, 1905), even if such marks were descriptive
or otherwise did not qualify as technical trademarks.100 This provision—often labeled the
Ten-Year Law—has been described as “a codification of the secondary meaning
theory.”101
Common law trademarks were initially entitled to broader protection than were
common law trade names.102 During the late nineteenth century, the courts recognized an
exclusive property right in trademarks that created a virtual monopoly on the part of the
trademark holder.103 As the United States Supreme Court reflected in The Trade-Mark
Cases, “The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or

sense, but as referring to a particular place or association”); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 50 (3d ed. 1929) (“In the absence of secondary meaning, the law of
unfair competition does not protect a name which is based on or is truly descriptive of the construction
common to, or characteristics of an article.”).
100
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946); Thaddeus Davids Co. v.
Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1914) (interpreting this section of the Act).
101
NIMS, supra note 99, at § 43; see also id. at § 229a. The now-ubiquitous trademark “Coca-Cola” is an
example of a mark that was registered under the Ten-Year Law. See Nashville Syrup Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 215 F. 527, 530 (6th Cir. 1914).
102
See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278-79 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (discussing differences between
technical trademarks and trade names); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A
Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316-17 (1979) (describing differences
between technical trademarks and trade names in the context of late-nineteenth century “legal formalism”);
Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: Part I, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168-70 (1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and trade
names); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4
(4th ed. 1924) (opining that trademark rights are “broader and by far . . . more valuable” than rights to a
trade-name).
103
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 343-44 (1980) (describing early treatment of
trademarks as “absolute property”); McClure, supra note 102, at 317-19 (characterizing early treatment of
technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic property rights); Grafton Dulany Cushing, On Certain
Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (1890) (noting that “[a] trademark has
become an absolute right”); cf. HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 24 (arguing that trademark rights are not
“monopolistic” in character).
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property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other
persons, has been long recognized by the common law. . . . It is a property right. . . .”104
Trade names, on the other hand, were protected only when they had acquired
secondary meaning, as discussed above, and only in cases of “fraud.”105 At its core, the
common law “fraud” requirement, in cases of unfair competition or trade dress
infringement, was and is essentially identical to the “likelihood of confusion” standard
that now applies in trademark infringement cases as well.106 In other words, there is no
trademark infringement and no “unfair” competition if the consumer is not likely to be
confused by the alleged misuse of the trademark or the trade name. Some earlier cases
involving common law trade names also required that, to constitute “fraud” necessary to
enjoin a competitor’s use of a trade name, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant
intended to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff; in other words, that the defendant

104

The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (emphasis added); see also Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S.
617, 619 (1879) (“The right to use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State, and, therefore,
must be deemed to extend everywhere.”).
105
See Cushing, supra note 103, at 332 (in “cases analogous to trade-marks,” i.e., cases involving common
law trade names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 22 (“While fraud is
presumed from the wrongful use of a trademark it must be proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of
unfair competition which do not involve a technical trademark.”) (citing cases); see also id. at § 61 (use of
“merely descriptive word” will not be restrained unless circumstances show “fraud on the part of the user”).
106
See, e.g., Auto Body Specialists, Inc. v. Vallee, 500 A.2d 372, 375 (N.H. 1985) (in a case of common
law infringement of a trade name, plaintiff’s right to injunctive relief depends on whether a “substantial
likelihood of confusion resulted from defendant’s use”) (Souter, J.) (citations omitted); Boice v. Stevenson,
187 P.2d 648, 653 (Ariz. 1947) (“The universal test [of unfair competition] is whether the public is likely to
be deceived”) (citation omitted); J.C. Penney Co. v. Walker, 395 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App. 1965) (Wilson,
J., concurring) (noting that, even if a descriptive name has acquired secondary meaning, “if there is not
shown confusion of the public or tendency to deception,” there is no unfair competition); Sartor v. Schaden,
101 N.W. 511, 513 (Iowa 1904) (even if a word is not “capable of becoming an arbitrary trade-mark,” if it
has acquired secondary meaning its use will be restrained if “confusion [of the public] has been or is likely
to be produced”); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. App. 1959) (whether trade
dress has been infringed depends in part on “whether the public is likely to be deceived”) (citation omitted);
New York World’s Fair v. World’s Fair News, 256 A.D. 373, 374 (N.Y. App. 1939) (“The determining
factor is not that people have actually been deceived but that there is a likelihood of that happening.”)
(citation omitted); see also Handler & Pickett, supra note 102, at 169 (competitor’s use of a trade names
will be restrained only when such use “render[s] it likely that the public will confuse the products bearing
the marks”).
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had an intent to confuse.107 This requirement, however, was applied inconsistently, with
most courts eventually adopting what the Supreme Court of Georgia characterized as the
“better view” that “an actual fraudulent intent need not be shown if the necessary and
probable tendency of defendant’s conduct is to deceive the public and to pass off his
goods or business as that of the plaintiff. . . .”108
As the monopolistic approach to trademarks gave way to the now-familiar maxim
that trademarks are not held “in gross,” courts imposed limitations on trademark rights
that were identical to those already in place for cases involving trade names.109
Therefore, the supposed distinction between common law trademarks and trade-names
became more formalistic than real, and courts began to treat the two classes of common
107

See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co., 395 S.W.2d at 79 (Wilson, J., concurring) (action for “deceptive simulation”
of “generic words” that have acquired secondary meaning requires a finding that “such simulation was
calculated to deceive ordinarily prudent persons”); Belleville News-Democrat, Inc. v. St. Clair County
Publishers, Inc., 167 N.E. 2d 573, 575 (Ill. App. 1960) (use of generic or descriptive word that has acquired
secondary meaning may be enjoined when its use by another “is palpably intended to deceive”); New York
World’s Fair, 256 A.D. at 375 (when “the appropriation and continued use of the name of another. . . are
conceived in bad faith and with an intent to deceive the public, equity will afford complete and adequate
relief. . . .”); Drive It Yourself Co. v. North, 130 A. 57, 59 (Md. App. 1925) (use of “merely generic or
descriptive” words may be enjoined only if there is “actual fraud or intent to deceive”); McClure, supra
note 102, at 317 (in an unfair competition claim plaintiff “was required to prove . . . fraudulent intent by the
defendant”).
108
Saunders System Atlanta Co., Inc. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924);
see also McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F.2d 293, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(“Unfair competition in the trade name field is not concerned with intent or plan; it is enough if the acts of
the defendant in light of plaintiff’s reputation result in an unfair benefit to the former”). According to the
Restatement of Torts, “fraud”—in terms of the defendant’s actual (not implied) intent to deceive the
public—was a required element of trade-name infringement under the common law only when plaintiff’s
trade-name had not acquired secondary meaning: “[t]he notion that fraud is necessary for trade name
infringement is largely due to the loose denomination of such a name as a trade name.” RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, supra note 99, at § 717 cmt. a; see also First Wisconsin Nt’l Bank v. Wichman, 270 N.W.2d 168,
173 (Wis. 1978) (same); see generally E.H. Schloper, Annotation, Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the
Law of Trademark and of Unfair Competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1133 (1944) (noting split of authorities as
to whether “it is necessary for the plaintiff to show actual fraud on the part of the defendant” in cases where
plaintiff’s rights in a trade-name are predicated on secondary meaning).
109
See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“Common-law trademarks,
and the right to their exclusive use, are, of course, to be classed among property rights, but only in the sense
that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good will that flows from it,
free from unwarranted interference by others, is a property right, for the protection of which a trademark is
an instrumentality. [T]he right grows out of use, not mere adoption.”) (emphasis added and internal
citation omitted); see also Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (“The tendency
of the courts at the present time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law applicable to technical trademarks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair competition.”) (citations omitted).
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law marks essentially the same.110 The Supreme Court recognized and articulated this
development in 1916:
Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a valuable
interest in the good-will of his trade or business. . . . The essence of the
wrong consists of the sale of the goods of one manufacturer for those of
another. This essential element is the same in trade-mark cases as in
cases of unfair competition unaccompanied by trademark infringement. In
fact, the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of
unfair competition.111
Despite this similarity of treatment under the common law, a trade name (unlike a
common law trademark) could not be registered under the Trademark Act of 1905 if it
did not meet the requirements of the Ten-Year Rule.112 This discrepancy was not
particularly important, as the benefits of federal registration were limited.
The rights of registered trademark holders expanded greatly when the Lanham
Act was passed in 1946. First, the Act expanded the types of marks that were eligible for
protection under the federal law by allowing registration of even “merely descriptive
marks,” so long as they have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce.”113 A “common descriptive” name of an article (i.e., a generic name),
however, could not be registered under any circumstances.114 Therefore, since 1946, a
descriptive mark that has acquired secondary meaning (but not a generic one) may be
110

See Handler & Pickett, supra note 102 (arguing that trademarks and trade names are essentially treated
the same under common law); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 99, at § 717 cmt. a (stating that “there
are no important differences between the protection given to the interest in trade-marks and that given to
the interest in trade names”).
111
Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added).
112
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946); Thaddeus Davids Co. v.
Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1914) (interpreting this section of the Act); Barber-Colman Co. v. Overhead
Door Corp., 65 F.2d 147, 150 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (holding that mark which has acquired secondary meaning,
but is not a technical trademark, cannot be registered under Trade-Mark Act of 1905 unless 10-year rule
applies); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940) (arguing that,
because trade names and trademarks are essentially treated the same under the common law, both should be
protected and registrable under the Federal Trademark Act).
113
Lanham Act, ch 540, § 2(e) & (f), 60 Stat 427, 429 (1946) (amended 1988).
114
Lanham Act, ch 540, § 15(4), 60 Stat 427, 434 (1946) (amended 1988).
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protected from infringement under the Lanham Act as well as the state common law of
unfair competition. Second, unlike previous iterations of the federal trademark statute,
the 1946 Lanham Act expanded the rights of registered trademark holders beyond those
attainable under common law. At common law, trademark (and trade name) rights were
limited to the mark holder’s geographic area of use—in other words, the first user of the
mark could claim priority only in those geographic areas in which his mark had acquired
“goodwill.”115 Under the 1946 Lanham Act, however, the holder of a registered mark
acquired nationwide priority against any “junior” user of the mark, even if the junior user
was the first to acquire goodwill in a given geographic area.116

b.

Common law treatment of generic or “common descriptive” terms
as trade-names

In contrast to the 1946 Lanham Act, the common law treated neither “descriptive”
nor “generic” terms as “technical trademarks,” and therefore they could not be protected
against trademark infringement. However, this discrepancy in terminology made little
practical difference, at least with regard to terms that had acquired secondary meaning.
As explained above, such terms were protected from infringement under the common law
doctrine of unfair competition.
Modern caselaw generally takes as a given the notion that, unlike descriptive
terms, “generic” words or terms are and have always been unprotectable under the

115

Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 414; United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 9798 (1918).
116
Lanham Act, ch 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat 427, 428 (1946) (amended 1988).
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common law, even if such words have acquired secondary meaning.117 Although courts
have consistently held that “generic” or “common descriptive” terms cannot be registered
as trademarks under the Lanham Act,118 a closer examination of the common law of
unfair competition reveals that these cases did not attempt to draw a bright line between
generic and descriptive terms.119 In other words, common law courts—unlike modern
ones—did not devote a great deal of attention to determining whether a given term should
be etymologically classified as generic or descriptive. Both “words descriptive of
qualities or attributes” and “generic designations” were potentially protectable as trade

117

See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1045 n. 22
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“generic term that acquires de facto secondary meaning is still not afforded trademark
protection”); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 924 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Trademarks
that have become generic are subject to cancellation even if they have acquired a secondary meaning.”);
Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979)
(generic term “cannot become a trademark under any circumstances”); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven proof of secondary meaning. . . cannot transform a
generic term into a subject for trademark.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,
9 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir.
1975) (“merely descriptive” terms can be “rescued as trademarks” via proof of secondary meaning, but
generic terms cannot); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, §§ 12:1, 12:47 (generic name “can
never function as a trademark to indicate origin”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15
cmt. a (1995) (“Generic designations are not subject to appropriation as trademarks at common law. . . .”);
3 LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 20:33 n. 49 &
50 (West 2004) (citing cases).
118
See, e.g., J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“common
descriptive name” of an article cannot be registered as a trademark, despite evidence of secondary
meaning); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel and Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(canceling registration of the mark Ha-Lush-Ka on the grounds that it was the “common descriptive name
for egg noodles”); In Re Space-General Corp., 136 U.S.P.Q. 77, 78 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (refusing registration
of Space Electronics for navigational guidance equipment on grounds that it was a “common descriptive
name”); In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772, 776 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (refusing registration of “Softsoap”
for liquid soap on grounds that “proof of secondary meaning cannot transform a generic term into a subject
for trademark registration”); but cf. In re Minnetonka, Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1711, 1713 (T.T.A.B. 1987)
(finding that “Softsoap” is not generic, based on additional evidence submitted in support of trademark
application).
119
See, e.g., Speaker v. Shaler Co., 87 F.2d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 1937) (noting that “descriptive words” are
“included within the broader category of generic terms”); HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 46 (defining a
“generic term” as any term that is “too general in its meaning to become the monopoly of an individual in
application to merchandise,” including geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words).

38

- -

names (but not as technical trademarks), if they functioned as source identifiers in the
marketplace (if, in other words, they had acquired secondary meaning).120
Although McCarthy characterizes this view as an “aberrant” one adopted by only
a minority of courts,121 numerous state and federal courts have held – particularly during
the pre-Lanham Act era – that so-called “generic terms” are entitled to protection from
“passing off” or infringement, if they have acquired secondary meaning. In fact, the
common law precedents of most states held that the secondary meaning doctrine applied
to words both “generic” and descriptive in character.122 Likewise, many federal courts
have also held that “purely generic or descriptive” words are entitled to protection from

120

Handler & Pickett, supra note 102, at 169; see also McClure, supra note 102, at 316 (same); HOPKINS,
supra note 102, at § 49 (noting that “[t]he protection of equity is extended under proper circumstances to
generic words as readily as to technical trademarks”); see generally Schloper, supra note 108, at 1095
(stating that “words, or combinations of words, may, by acquiring secondary meaning, become entitled to
protection . . . though in their primary sense they are . . . generic or descriptive”).
121
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:46.
122
See, e.g., Bell v. Davidson, 597 P.2d 753, 755 (Ok. 1979) (generic or descriptive names may be
protected against unfair competition if they have acquired secondary meaning); Staple Cotton Cooperative
Ass’n v. Federal Staple Cotton Co-op Ass’n, 162 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1964) (same); Storm v. Canyon
Amusement Corp., 79 N.W. 2d 698, 700 (S.D. 1956) (same); Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden
Slipper Rest. & Catering, 88 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1952) (same); Farrell v. Mennen Co., 235 P.2d 128, 130 (Utah
1951) (same); Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P.2d 227, 229 (Wyo. 1945) (same); Houston v. Berde, 2 N.W.2d
9, 10 (Minn. 1942) (when “generic words are used in a trade-name,” their use will be restrained when such
use causes confusion or deception); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 104 P.2d 650,
652 (Cal. 1940) (deceptive use of “generic, descriptive, personal, and geographic names” that have
acquired secondary meaning constitutes unfair competition); Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader Filling Stations
Corp., 196 N.E. 852, 855 (Mass. 1935); Electric Supply Co. v. Hess, 245 P. 27, 28 (Wash. 1926)
(secondary meaning doctrine applies to “common, descriptive [and] generic words”); Saunders System
Atlanta Co., Inc. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924) (same); American
Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) (plaintiff can exclude defendant
from “the mere use of generic words, unqualified and unexplained, when they would mislead plaintiff’s
customers to another shop”); MacPhail v. Stevens, 586 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1978) (generic and
descriptive terms are not entitled to trademark protection without a showing of secondary meaning); AntiDefamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 543-44 (1972)
(either “generic or descriptive” tradenames may be entitled to protection upon showing of secondary
meaning); Williamson v. Answer Phone of Jacksonville, Inc., 118 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. App. 1960) (same);
Better Business Bureau of Kansas City Adv. Club, Inc. v. D. J. Chappell, 307 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. App.
1957) (same); Moskins Stores, Inc. v. Columbus Bentley Mercantile Co., 22 Ohio Law Abs. 488, 1936 WL
4309 at *1 (Oh. App. 1936) (same; quoting Corpus Juris); Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 104
N.E. 34, 38 (Ind. App. 1914) (same).
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unfair competition, provided that they have acquired secondary meaning.123 Although
the reasoning of these cases (particularly the federal ones) has largely been repudiated,124
some states still adhere to this doctrine. For example, in 1985 Justice Souter (while
sitting on the New Hampshire Supreme Court) wrote that “words or phrases may enter
commerce as merely generic or descriptive, but commercial usage can invest them with a
secondary meaning associating them with a given business, so as to entitle that business
to protect the association.”125 Oregon also recognizes that “generic names” may acquire
“a legally protectible secondary meaning” under the common law.126 As recently as
1998, a Pennsylvania court held that even though a “generic term” is never granted
trademark protection, “an action for unfair competition on the basis of likelihood of

123

Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 659-60 (Cir. Ct. Del. 1899); see also Murphy Door
Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing state law
doctrine by which “a generic term already in public use later acquires secondary meaning . . . thus
warranting trademark protection”); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374-75 (1st Cir.
1980) (although “at common law terms that are generic are normally not subject to appropriation as
trademarks, . . . a strong showing of secondary meaning may be sufficient to grant a right to exclusive
use”); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 & 1253 (7th Cir. 1970)
(noting that “in the absence of a strong showing of secondary meaning, a generic name cannot be the basis
of a trademark”); Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1935)
(generic word may acquire secondary meaning); G.W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 F.
703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904) (“unfair use” of even a “purely generic or descriptive word” may be enjoined as
unfair competition); Dadirrian v. Yacubian, 98 F. 872, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1900) (“secondary use of a generic
term” may be protected if such use may confuse the public); Bliss Cleaning Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest Brake
Bond Co., 339 F. Supp. 2d 944, 965 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (“Generic and descriptive marks. . . are not entitled
to trademark protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning”); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
v. Nationwide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 908 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (same);
American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F.2d 488, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (words which are
“purely generic or descriptive” are not arbitrary trade-marks, but still may be protected from unfair
competition); Dry Ice Corp. of America v. Louisiana Dry Ice Corp., 46 F.2d 526, 531 (W.D. La. 1930)
(secondary meaning doctrine may apply to descriptive words or “names of a generic class”), rev’d on other
grounds, 54 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1932).
124
See note 117, supra.
125
Auto Body Specialists, Inc. v. Vallee, 500 A.2d 372, 374 (N.H. 1985) (finding “auto body specialists” to
be a protectable trade name) (emphasis added). In Vallee, Justice Souter characterized the “view that
generic (or even some descriptive) terms are inherently incapable of ever becoming secondary meaning
marks” as “ill-considered.” Id. (emphasis in original).
126
Classic Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments, Inc., 700 P.2d 677, 687 (Or. App. 1985) (citation
omitted); see also Liquidators v. Clifton, 286 P. 152, 153 (Or. 1930); Umpqua Broccoli Exchange v.
Umqua Valley Broccoli Growers, 245 P. 324, 327 (Or. 1926).
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confusion may still lie.”127 Of course, most “generic” names (e.g., apple peeler, beer,
cookies) are unlikely, by their very nature, to acquire secondary meaning, and therefore
were unlikely to acquire protection under the common law.128 However, most common
law cases did not hold that “generic” names were inherently incapable of acquiring
secondary meaning.
Modern courts refuse to extend trademark protection to generic words or terms
because they are concerned that doing so would negatively impact competition: “[N]o
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting
the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to
call an article by its name.”129 The early common law courts shared this same concern,
and for this reason they were unwilling to extend trademark rights—which were, at least
initially, significantly more monopolistic in character than rights in a trade name130—to
generic or descriptive words or terms. In 1871 the United States Supreme Court held that
neither a “generic name, [nor] a name merely descriptive of an article of trade. . . [may]
be employed as a trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection.”131
However, as noted above, the courts’ refusal to extend trademark rights to such
words did not preclude their protection as trade names under the common law doctrine of
unfair competition. The courts attempted to protect competition in such cases via what
today would be characterized as “classic fair use”—the principle that a trademark holder
127

Pennsylvania State Univ. v. University Orthopedics, Ltd., 706 A.2d 863, 871 (Pa. Super. 1998).
See, e.g., Bourne, 385 P.2d at 736 (noting that when a trade name is “primarily composed of generic or
descriptive words” instead of words that “have some distinctive or identifying character of their own,” it is
“much more difficult to prove a secondary meaning”).
129
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
130
See notes 102-104 and accompanying text, supra.
131
Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (emphasis added).
128
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cannot “prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their goods.” 132
Therefore, even if a generic or descriptive term had acquired secondary meaning and
hence was protectible as a “trade name,” a competitor could use that term to describe his
own goods, so long as the goods were marked in a manner that would “clearly [denote]
the origin, manufacture or ownership of such articles,” and/or negate “any idea that they
were produced or sold” by the trade name holder.133 Therefore, a competitor was not
deprived of “the right to call an article by its name”134; he could do so, so long as his use
of the name did not “mislead the public and divert business from his competitor to
himself.”135

2. Death by Patent—the Emergence of the Primary Significance Test

As explained above, under the common law of unfair competition, the courts did
not place a great deal of emphasis on the etymological distinction between generic and
descriptive terms, and therefore few cases attempted to demarcate a finite border between
the two. However, the courts did hold that some words or terms—even those that were
132

New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub. Co., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (party’s use of a trademark “which is descriptive of and used fairly and in
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party” is not actionable); Cairns v. Franklin Mint
Co., 292 F.2d 1139, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining the difference between “classic” and “nominative’
fair use).
133
Dennison Mf’g Co. v. Thomas Mf’g Co., 94 F. 651, 659-60 (Cir. Ct. D. Del. 1899); see also Guastavino
Co. v. Comerma, 180 F. 920, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); G .& C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th
Cir. 1912) (if descriptive words have acquired secondary meaning, defendant “is required to accompany his
use of the bare word with sufficient distinguishing marks. . . to prevent the otherwise normally resulting
fraud”); Hansen v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 106 F. 691, 692 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1900); American Waltham
Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 87, 53 N.E. 141, 142 (1899) (“mere use of generic
words, unqualified and unexplained,” may be enjoined when such use would mislead consumers)
(emphasis added); Skinner v. Martin, 109 U.S.P.Q. 156, 158 (Cal. App. Super. 1956) (when trade name
protection is extended to words which are also “generic,” restriction of use “will be considerably more
limited. . . because the words tell the truth generally, and only in special uses are deceptive”).
134
See note 129, supra.
135
OK Bus & Baggage Co. v. OK Transfer & Storage Co., 165 P. 136, 140 (Ok. 1917).
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arbitrary or fanciful and presumed to be distinctive—did not act as source identifiers and
hence could not be trademarks or trade names. The courts recognized the evolutionary
nature of language, such that even “technical” trademarks could lose their ability to act as
source identifiers and hence lose their entitlement to protection from infringement. This
phenomenon, which we now refer to as genericide, was much more likely to occur when
the mark was placed on a product that was or had been the subject of a utility patent.136
Trademark holders who obtain patents on the goods to which their trademarks are
attached may fall victim to their own success. Because the trademark/patent holder
enjoys a monopoly over the production of the good during the patent period, the
trademark label placed on the good typically serves a dual function: to identify the sole
source of the good (i.e., the trademark holder) and to identify the good itself.137 When
the patent period ends, consumers continue to identify the good by using the trademark.
Therefore, when new producers come into the marketplace, they suffer a serious
competitive disadvantage if they cannot use the trademark to identify the good. After all,
the consuming public understands nothing else, regardless of whether the term would
otherwise be characterized as arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive. The Supreme
Court has described the “death by patent” process as follows:
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See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (Singer); Nupla Corp., v. IXL Mfg. Co., Inc, 114 F.3d 191
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Cush-N-Grip); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Manufacturing Co., 343 F.2d 655
(7th Cir. 1965) (yo-yo); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936)
(cellophane); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Dan Floss A/S. 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1628, 1629 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (Massflo);
Birtcher Electro Medical Systems, Inc. v. Beacon Laboratories, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 417 (D.Colo. 1990)
(Argon Beam Coagulator); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin); Haughton
Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 81 (Comm'r. Pat. 1950) (escalator); Charles R. De Bevoise Co.
v. H.& W. Co., 60 A. 407 (N.J. Eq. 1905) (brassiere); Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878)
(linoleum).
137
See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118; Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 186-87; Blinded Veterans Ass’n v.
Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035, 1044 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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It . . . follows from the cessation of the [patent] monopoly and the falling
of the patented device into the domain of all things public that along with
the public ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the
public the generic designation of the thing which has arisen during the
monopoly. [T]he designated name. . . [is] . . . necessary to vest the public
with the full enjoyment of that which ha[s] become theirs by the
disappearance of the monopoly.138
Consider, for example, the terms “aspirin” and “shredded wheat.”139 In both
cases the manufacturer had a patent on the product. It marketed the product solely under
a mark of its choosing but did not offer the public or a potential future competitor an
alternative term with which to refer to the product.140 The contemporaneous use of the
patent and trademark created a situation in which competitors and courts could credibly
claim that the term in question was the general name of the product and not a source
identifier and, therefore, unprotectable.
Judge Learned Hand eloquently described the genericide process in Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co.,141 a case involving the genericide of a name that was initially fanciful
(“aspirin”)142 but became generic. In this case, Judge Hand found that consumers (not
surprisingly) did not recognize “monoaceticacidester of salicylicacid” or “acetyl salicylic
acid” as the name of their favorite headache remedy:
The single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is merely one of fact: What do
the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending? If
138

Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118 (citing Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 185). Although this language from
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Kellogg and Singer could be interpreted to suggest that a trademark
applied to a patented product necessarily becomes generic upon expiration of the patent, courts have almost
uniformly held to the contrary: whether a trademark becomes generic upon expiration of the underlying
patent is a question of fact. President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159, 163 (2d. Cir. 1916)
(citation omitted); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:52.
139
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. 111 (shredded wheat); Bayer Co., 272 F. 505 (aspirin).
140
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 117; Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510-11 (finding that the consumer had “never heard
the name ‘acetylsalicylic acid’ as applied to [the drug], and without some education could not possibly have
kept it in his mind, if he had”); compare Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2003)
(noting that “[s]ometimes a trademark owner will sponsor a generic term precisely in order to avoid its
mark becoming generic”).
141
272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
142
Id. at 509 (describing “aspirin” as a “coined” word that “means nothing by itself”).
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they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then, I take it, it makes no
difference whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to get them to understand
more. He has failed . . . .143
Judge Hand concluded that the word “aspirin” was no longer a valid trademark for
consumers because it had lost all of its ability to function as a source identifier for the
consumer.144
The record was not quite so clear when Justice Brandeis wrote his seminal
opinion of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.145 This case addressed the question of
whether the term “Shredded Wheat” was “generic” and hence unprotectable as a common
law trade name.146 The process for making the product in question, shredded wheat, had
been patented and, during that period of exclusive use, only the term “shredded wheat”
had been applied to the product.147 After that patent expired, the question arose as to
whether the term “shredded wheat” was available to all makers of “pillow-shaped wheat
biscuits” or whether the successor in interest to the goodwill of the patent holder should
have the exclusive use of the term.148 This case is frequently cited as the source of the

143

Id.
Id. at 510 (finding that consumers “did not understand by the word [aspirin] anything more than a kind
of drug”). Judge Hand reached the opposite conclusion with regard to the “manufacturing chemists, retail
druggists, and physicians” who purchased the drug directly from Bayer. Id. at 513. He found that this class
of purchasers understood “Aspirin” to mean “the plaintiff's manufacture,” and further that they “ha[d]
recourse to another and an intelligible name for it [acetyl salicylic acid], actually in use among them.” Id.
As to this group of consumers, Hand concluded that “Aspirin” was still a valid and protectable trademark.
Id. at 513-14.
145
305 U.S. 111 (1938). For an excellent investigation regarding the history and importance of Kellogg,
see Graeme Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
146
The Court recognized that common law governed whether the mark “Shredded Wheat” was protectable.
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 113.
147
Id. at 118.
148
Id. at 111-12.
144
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“primary significance” doctrine, which has become the touchstone for genericism
analysis today, both in case law149 and in the Lanham Act itself.150
Applying the terminology of Folsom and Teply, Justice Brandeis essentially
found that “Shredded Wheat” was a hybrid trademark151: some consumers perceived it as
a source identifier, but others perceived it as the generic name of the article. Brandeis
recognized that “many people have come to associate the product, and as a consequence
the name by which the product is generally known, with the plaintiff’s factory at Niagara
Falls.”152 However, he determined that this understanding of the term as a source
identifier was only its “subordinate meaning.”153 Because the Court found that the
generic understanding of “Shredded Wheat” was the predominant or “primary
significance” of the term, it held that “Shredded Wheat” was not a protectable trade
name.154
Justice Brandeis’ opinion can and should be interpreted in the context of the
common law as it was understood when the opinion was written. As noted above, during
this period courts did not often attempt to delineate between “generic” and descriptive
terms (and may have used these monikers interchangeably); in either case, their focus
was rather on whether the word(s) in question had acquired “secondary meaning.” In
language strikingly similar to that employed by Justice Brandeis, the Restatement of
149

See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying “primary
significance” test in finding “instant message” generic); Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir.
1996) (mark is generic if its “primary significance. . . to the relevant public is to identify the class of
product or service”); Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3rd Cir. 1993) ( “the primary
significance test must be utilized to determine a term’s genericness”).
150
See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the
generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”)
151
See notes 58-59 and accompanying text, supra.
152
305 U.S. at 118.
153
Id.
154
Id.

46

- -

Torts (published in 1938, the same year as Shredded Wheat), explained that “secondary
meaning” does not refer to “a subordinate or rare significance. It means rather a
subsequent significance added to the previous meaning of the designation and becoming
in the market its usual and primary significance.”155
Considered in this context, Justice Brandeis’ reasoning in Shredded Wheat can at
least arguably best be understood as a clarification of the common law secondary
meaning doctrine—a holding that the doctrine applies only when the source-identifying
function of the alleged trade name has become its “primary significance” in the mind of
the consumer. Conversely, at least when dealing with a descriptive word or term, if the
“primary” significance is not that of a source identifier, it cannot be protected as a
common law trade name. Viewed in this light, the lesson to be learned from Shredded
Wheat is that a term is “generic” and hence not a valid trade name when it has failed to
acquire or has lost its secondary meaning—when its source-identifying capacity is not or
is no longer its “primary significance.” In Shredded Wheat, Justice Brandeis found that
“shredded wheat” lacked secondary meaning, primarily because it was “the term by
which the biscuit in pillow-shaped form [was] generally known to the public.”156 Even
though the term “shredded wheat” apparently retained some degree of source-identifying
capacity, this was the “subordinate meaning” of the term and not its “primary
significance.”157

155

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 99, at § 716 (b) & cmt. b (emphasis added).
305 U.S. at 116-17. The Court noted that “[f]or many years, there was no attempt to use the term. . . as
a trade-mark.” Id.; see also id. at 117 (noting that, in 1905, the Commissioner of Patents refused to
register “Shredded Whole Wheat” as a mark under the Ten-Year Clause of the 1905 Act, on grounds that
“these words accurately and aptly describe an article of food which has been produced for more than ten
years”) (internal citation omitted).
157
Id. at 118.
156
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Some courts have interpreted Brandeis’ reasoning in this manner and have cited
Shredded Wheat in support of the common law proposition that if the “primary
significance” of a term is that of a source identifier (i.e., it has acquired secondary
meaning), it may be a protectable mark, even if it might otherwise be characterized as
“generic.”158 However, as noted previously, the modern trend has been to absolutely bar
any type of trademark protection for “generic” words (under either the Lanham Act or
common law), and federal opinions holding otherwise have largely been disavowed or
reversed.159 For example, in Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Co., the First Circuit stated in
dicta that, although “at common law terms that are generic are normally not subject to
appropriation as trademarks, . . . a strong showing of secondary meaning may be
sufficient to grant a right to exclusive use”160

However, in a decision issued one year

later, the First Circuit disavowed that statement, labeling it an “error” derived from
“precisely the same error” by Justice Brandeis in Shredded Wheat.161
In rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the secondary meaning doctrine applied, Justice
Brandeis wrote that “[t]here is no basis here for applying the doctrine of secondary
meaning.”162 Most modern courts avoid the perceived “error” described by the First
Circuit in Keebler by interpreting the above statement by Brandeis as an affirmation of
the proposition that, if a term is generic, it cannot be protected as a trade mark, regardless
158

See, e.g., American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 & 1253 (7th Cir.
1970) (noting that “in the absence of a strong showing of secondary meaning, a generic name cannot be the
basis of a trademark”); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1962)
(holding that “[a] mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the public as an indication
of the nature or class of an article,” and further “[t]o become generic the principle significance of the word
must be its [generic meaning], rather than an indication of its origin”).
159
See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906-07 (D.R.I. 1980)
(rejecting proposition that a term can be “’generic’ in the face of the admitted presence of secondary
meaning”), rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981).
160
624 F.2d 366, 374-75 (1st Cir. 1980).
161
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1981).
162
Id.
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of whether there is evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning.163 Instead, the
courts apply the primary significance test to determine whether a word or term is
“generic” in the first instance, separate from any consideration of secondary meaning. As
further discussed below, their attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty.

3. The Modern Genericism Doctrine: Who are you? What are you?

As the primary significance test took hold, courts interpreted it differently and
struggled to navigate the questions the test poses. Most modern courts approach the
question of whether a term is or has become generic by applying a now-familiar test,
borrowed from the language of scientific classification: a generic term is one that is, or
has become, the name of a class of goods or services, the “genus of which the particular
product or service is a species.”164 Specifically put in the context of the primary
significance test, the question becomes whether “the primary significance of the
trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer.”165 If so, “the
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See note 117, supra, and note 188, infra; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 145, at 236 (“As the Court
noted, the existence of secondary meaning was beside the point once the term was classified as generic. No
evidence of plentiful sales or extensive advertising, typical evidence pointing to secondary meaning, could
alter the unprotectability of the term SHREDDED WHEAT.”).
164
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added); see also Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,194 (1985); Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979); cf. Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg, & Steven
M. Weinberg, A Proposal for Evaluating Genericism after “Anti-Monopoly, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101,
109-110 (1983) (noting the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be determined
by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”).
165
Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Blinded
Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A generic
term is one commonly used to denote a product or other item or entity, one that indicates the thing itself,
rather than any particular feature or exemplification of it.”); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,
Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (generic term “connotes the basic nature of articles or services rather
than the more individualized characteristics of a particular product”) (citation omitted).
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trademark is a generic term and cannot be a valid trademark.”166 Somewhat curiously,
some courts have attempted to refine this test by relying upon the “who-are-you/whatare-you” test: “A mark answers the buyer's questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you
come from?’ ‘Who vouches for you?’ But the generic name of the product answers the
question ‘What are you?’”167 Although the test may seem simple in its articulation (once
one gets past the difficulty of making a trademark talk and answer questions), it has
proved difficult in application.

III. Problems Created by the Current Iteration and Application of the Genericide
Doctrine

The following section examines some of the key difficulties that have arisen to
confound courts in the application of the modern genericide doctrine. In this section we
argue that the current doctrine over-emphasizes the etymological categorization of words,
rather than the core questions of (1) whether the mark functions as a source-identifier in a
commercial context, and (2) whether trademark protection will help or hinder
competition. We begin by examining the genus/species and “once generic, always
generic” precepts that guide courts when determining whether a term is generic and show
why these approaches lead the doctrine astray. We then explain how current doctrine
relies on overbroad evidence when making a genericism determination, such that
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Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Society of Fin. Examiners v. National Ass’n of Certified Fraud
Examiners, 41 F.3d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1995); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, 531 F.2d 11,
13 (2d Cir. 1975); Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (E.D. Wash.
2006); Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 571 (D.N.J. 1985) (describing “who are
you-what are you” test as “the clearest test for genericness”).
167
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trademark holders are forced to waste resources and pursue otherwise noninfringing uses
as they police their marks. Finally, this section examines the relationship between the
dilution doctrine’s rights-in-gross, property-based understanding of trademarks to the
evolution of the genericism doctrine.

A. The Elusive Distinction between Genus and Species, or Generic and
Descriptive Terms
One of the key conceptual problems in understanding the genericism doctrine and
indeed trademark law is the way in which the law parses the difference between the name
of a product class (which is considered generic) and the name of a particular product
(which may be a valid trademark). In other words, where do we draw the line between
genus and species? Put in the context of the spectrum of marks, the question may
become whether the mark is generic (and hence incapable of functioning as a trademark)
because it is the name of a product class, or merely descriptive of a particular product
within that class of goods or services, in which case the mark may be afforded trademark
protection upon a showing of secondary meaning. We argue that this elusive distinction
should not be the cornerstone of genericism analysis.168
In theory the distinction between product class and product, or generic and
descriptive terms, should be simple. A generic term is the common name for a product or
product class, which has no ability to function as a source identifier. In truth, these words
or terms are rarely if ever the source of trademark litigation. After all, few companies
168

See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1351 (stating that the courts “have made artificial and
unworkable distinctions with respect to the classification of a trademarked word as generic or descriptive”
in determining whether to allow proof of secondary meaning); see also Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg,
supra note 164, at 109-110 (noting the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be
determined by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”).
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(and even fewer marketers) are likely to choose names that are obviously generic (e.g.,
cookie, beer, restaurant) to distinguish their goods or services, because they are incapable
of doing so. In many cases, however, words or terms are found to be generic (i.e., the
name of a product class) when, at least to the naked eye, they appear to be descriptive—
that is, they describe the attributes of the good or service to which they are attached: e.g.,
Lite Beer,169 Filipino Yellow Pages,170 Blinded Veterans Association,171 Warehouse
Shoes.172 In such cases, it is not difficult to see why the putative trademark holder may
have been surprised to learn that he had chosen a “generic” name for his business.173 As
stated previously, a generic term is not protectable as a mark, regardless of whether it has
acquired secondary meaning among the relevant group of consumers.174
This scenario may best be understood as the inverse of the “death by patent”
phenomenon described earlier. In these cases, a company does not use an arbitrary or
fanciful name to describe a state-of-the art, newly patented product. Instead, the
company uses a common (or arguably descriptive) name that the consumer already
understands to describe the relevant good or service. The company extensively markets
169

See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (“lite beer”
found generic).
170
See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Filipino Yellow Pages” found generic).
171
Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(“Blinded Veterans Association” found generic).
172
See Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Shoe Warehouse” and
“Warehouse Shoes” found generic).
173
This difficulty was exacerbated by the Patent and Trademark Office’s creation of yet a third category of
terms by refusing to register terms that it characterizes as “so highly descriptive” that they cannot function
as marks, even though they are not “generic.” See, e.g., In re Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., 224
U.S.P.Q. 309 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (refusing to register “Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc.,” as applied to
seminars in industrial relations, on grounds that it was too highly descriptive, regardless of whether it had
acquired secondary meaning); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:22; see also Linda
McLeod, The Status of So Highly Descriptive and Acquired Distinctiveness, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 607,
623-27 (1992) (criticizing PTO practice of refusing to register marks on grounds that they are “so highly
descriptive”). In the 1997 edition of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, the PTO instructed
examiners to abandon the practice of refusing to register marks on grounds that they were “so highly
descriptive” that they could not function as marks. T.M.E.P. § 1209.01(c) (1997 rev.).
174
See note 117, supra, and note 188, infra.
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and advertises its good or service, and through its efforts the name attached to the good or
service acquires secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public. In other
words, even though the name did not act as a source identifier when the company adopted
it, it evolves to function in this manner, much the same way even an arbitrary or fanciful
term attached to a newly patented product may evolve into a generic word when it loses
its ability to function as a source-identifier. In this type of situation, the mark holder’s
fate rides on the court’s determination of whether the word or term initially chosen was
generic or descriptive. The courts themselves acknowledge that the distinctions between
categories of marks (e.g., generic v. descriptive, or descriptive v. suggestive) “are less
than clearly defined and may be difficult to utilize.”175
Judge Becker of the Third Circuit tackled the question of how to distinguish a
generic term from a descriptive one in A.J. Canfield Company v. Honickman.176 In
Canfield the product at issue was Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda.177 The legal issue was
whether “‘chocolate fudge’ as applied to diet soda” was entitled to federal trademark
status.178 Judge Becker noted that the question was a difficult one as to which reasonable
minds not only could disagree but had disagreed, as evidenced by three district courts
analyzing the question and reaching three different results: suggestive (or at worst
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Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 979 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Henri’s Food
Products Co., Inc. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987) (difference between “common
descriptive name,” aka generic term, and “merely descriptive mark” often “is not visible to the naked eye”);
Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that “courts often have difficulty in distinguishing between generic and descriptive terms”);
and note 69, supra.
176
A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
177
Id. at 292.
178
Id.
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descriptive), descriptive, and generic.179 Judge Becker found that “diet chocolate fudge
soda” was not suggestive because, rather than “requir[ing] imagination, thought or
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods,” the phrase “denote[d] a
flavor” and consumers would need no imagination to understand the nature of the soda.180
The court then turned to the question of whether the term was descriptive or generic.
To make this determination the court attempted to “define the relevant product
category, or ‘genus.’”181 Judge Becker found, however, that neither the primary
significance test nor an examination of consumer perceptions helped determine what he
held was the first question to understand, namely “whether chocolate soda or chocolate
fudge soda is the relevant product genus for evaluating genericness.…”182 Judge Becker
noted that the primary significance test is of no use until one has determined the status of
the term:
[T]he primary significance test is generally satisfied if a term signifies a product
that emanates from a single source, i.e., a product brand, but it is not satisfied if
the product that emanates from a single source is not only a product brand but is
also a product genus. The primary significance test does not, in and of itself, tell
us how to differentiate a mere product brand from a product genus.183
In other words, when examining the question of genericness, where the court draws the
line between genus and species may be somewhat arbitrary and strongly controls if not
predetermines the outcome of the case. If the court deems the term in question to denote
a product category, then it would be considered a genus and hence generic. Yet if the
court determines that the product is part of a larger category or genus, then it will almost
179

Id. (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d
903 (7th Cir.1986); Canfield v. Concord Beverages Co. (Scirica, J.); Yoo-Hoo Chocolate Beverages Corp.
v. A.J. Canfield Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 653 (D.N.J.1986) (Sarokin, J.)).
180
A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 297-98 (citations omitted).
181
Id. at 298 (citation omitted).
182
Id. at 299.
183
Id. at 301.
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certainly find that the term is descriptive and can be a trademark if secondary meaning is
shown. Under such an approach, the boundaries of genericism are infinitely malleable.184
Judge Becker elucidated the malleability of the test when he wrote: “For
example, in Kellogg, if wheat cereals were the relevant product class, then Shredded
Wheat would be merely a brand. But once it was decided that cereals containing pillowshaped forms of wheat shreds was the relevant product class, the term ‘shredded wheat’
was obviously generic.”185 For this reason, the genus/species distinction is singularly
unhelpful in notifying a potential trademark holder or her competitor of whether a given
term will be considered “generic” by the courts.
The inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of the current system imposes costs
on both trademark holders and the public. From the trademark holder’s perspective, the
prospect of adopting a descriptive mark is a tempting one—once the mark has acquired
distinctiveness, or secondary meaning (which is presumed after five years of
“substantially exclusive and continuous use”), it may be registered and entitled to the full
protections of the Lanham Act.186 Moreover, unlike fanciful or arbitrary marks (or, to a
lesser degree, even suggestive ones), the descriptive trademark has the added advantage
of informing the consumer about the attributes of the good or service to which it is
attached, reducing the need to inform the consumer of these attributes via advertising.187
However, because the putative trademark holder (even one with a highly-paid legal staff)
arguably has no real way of knowing whether a descriptive term will be characterized as
a genus (i.e., generic and hence invalid) or descriptive of a species, he runs the risk of
184

See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 110 (characterizing the genus-species test as
a “meaningless” and “infinitely manipulable” classification attempt).
185
A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 301 n. 12.
186
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f).
187
See note 87 and accompanying text, supra.
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losing the considerable investment that he may have made in establishing secondary
meaning. Because secondary meaning is presumptively acquired after five years of use,
many trademark holders wait this period of time before even attempting to register an
arguably descriptive trademark. As a result, five years of advertising and accumulated
goodwill may go down the proverbial drain.
Consumers lose in this scenario as well. When a trademark holder invests
considerable sums of money to create secondary meaning—in other words, to create a
connection between a particular product or source and the mark in the mind of the
consuming public—not surprisingly, she often succeeds. When secondary meaning is
established and the putative mark is functioning as a source-identifier, confusion and
inefficiency may result when the mark is deemed “generic” and free for all to use.

B. Once Generic, Always Generic
In addition to the inherent uncertainties in determining whether a term is or has
become generic, another troublesome feature of the modern doctrine is the permanence of
that determination. Although one might assume that, all things being equal, if a
trademark can transmute from arbitrary or fanciful to generic because it no longer
functions as a mark (i.e., it is no longer a source identifier), it should be able to travel in
the other direction—from generic to at least some type of protectable mark if it functions
as one in the minds of the consuming public. Such an assumption, however, would be
incorrect, at least in the context of modern trademark law. Under these circumstances the
mark is said to have acquired only “de facto” secondary meaning, which is the legal
equivalent of no secondary meaning: “No amount of purported proof that a generic term
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has acquired a secondary meaning associating it with a particular producer can transform
that term into a registrable trademark.”188
For example, in Harley-Davidson Inc. v. Grottanelli,189 in which the term “HOG”
was deemed generic, “[s]urveys of motorcycle enthusiasts in the trial record reflected a
ninety-eight percent association of HOG with Harley.”190 Yet, the court found that the
term was generic prior to Harley-Davidson’s first use of it as a mark in the 1980’s,
largely based on dictionary definitions of the term dating back to 1967 and usage of the
term by the media in 1935.191 As a result, even though the “primary significance” of
HOG in 1999 was that of a source-identifier (i.e., a trademark), it legally could not
function as one.192 The court reasoned that “[t]he public has no more right than a
manufacturer to withdraw from the language a generic term, already applicable to the
relevant category of products, and accord it trademark significance, at least as long as the
term retains some generic meaning.”193 The fact that HOG as applied to motorcycles
would ordinarily be considered an arbitrary and hence highly distinctive mark made no
difference.194
In another recent example, defendant Lindows.com argued that Microsoft
Corporation’s trademark “Windows,” as applied to operating software, was a generic
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Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 1980); see also note 117, supra.
164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
190
Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 654 (1999) (citing Grotanelli
Appellate Record at A76). See also Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80 n. 6 (noting that “even if the mark
is descriptive there is enough evidence of secondary meaning to support the District Court’s order [holding
that the mark was valid and infringed]”, but reversing on the ground that “light beer” or “lite beer” is a
generic name).
191
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 810-11 & n. 8, 10; see also id. at n. 2 (citing media usage of the term
throughout 1960’s and 1970’s).
192
See also Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80 n.6.
193
Harley-Davidson, Inc.,164 F.3d at 812. The court concluded that the term HOG retained generic
meaning based on dictionary definitions of the term in 1992. Id. at 810-11 & n. 9.
194
Id. at 810 (“No manufacturer can take out of the language a word, even a slang term, that has
generic meaning as to a category of products and appropriate it for its own trademark use,”).
189
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term, unprotectable as a trademark, because it was used generically by the public when
Microsoft adopted it in the 1980’s. The district court refused to grant summary judgment
on this issue, due to the existence of disputed issues of fact. It ultimately held, however,
that it would instruct the jury to “consider whether the Windows mark was generic during
the period before Microsoft Windows 1.0 entered the marketplace in November 1985”
and would “not instruct the jury that even if Windows were generic prior to November
1985, the trademark would nonetheless be valid today so long as the primary significance
of the term today is not generic.”195 In short, the jury would be told that a generic term
was not capable of achieving trademark status, even if its “primary significance,” in the
mind of the consuming public, was that of a source-identifier. Less than six months after
the court rendered this decision, Microsoft and Lindows entered into a “global
settlement” under which Microsoft agreed to pay Lindows $20 million to relinquish its
name and all related Web domains to Microsoft.196
Although some courts, including the Second Circuit in Grotanelli, have suggested
that it may be possible for generic terms to evolve into protectable trademarks, few have
so held. 197 Even those courts that have recognized the possibility of such a
transformation have refused to apply the “primary significance” test to determine the
status of the mark in question; instead, they have suggested that formerly generic terms
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Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 2004 WL 329250 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (emphasis in original).
Joris Evers, Microsoft to Pay $20M to End Lindows Trademark Battle, Jul. 19, 2004,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/07/19/Hnmslindowstrademark_1.html.
197
The Grotanelli court suggested that “if a generic word could ever be infused with trademark
significance, the word must have ceased to have current generic meaning.” 164 F.3d at 811. See also New
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
“[a]n interesting question is whether a word, although once generic, may become protectable”) (dicta).
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may function as marks only when the generic meaning of the term has been completely
obliterated from the public consciousness.198
The courts have been slightly more receptive to the idea that generic words may
become protectable trademarks, upon acquisition of secondary meaning, when the
generic word is being “reclaimed” by the former trademark holder—i.e., the word or term
began its life as a trademark; fell victim to genericide; and then came full circle back to
its former trademark status.199 Even these types of cases have been characterized as
“extraordinarily rare.”200 The two most commonly cited examples of trademarks that
resurfaced from the public domain are “Singer” for sewing machines201 and “Goodyear”
for tires.202 More recently, the Federal Circuit held that Opryland could introduce
evidence that the term “opry,” as applied to country music entertainment, was not
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See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Where a generic
association of a word or term has become obsolete and is discoverable only by resort to historical sources
or dictionaries compiled on historical principles to preserve from oblivion obsolete words, then, from the
viewpoint of trademark and like law, the word or term is no longer a generic word.”).
199
See, e.g., Grotanelli, 164 F.3d at 811 (distinguishing such cases on the basis that the words at issue “were
originally proper names of the manufacturer”).
200
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:30.
201
See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that Singer had
“recaptured from the public domain the name ‘Singer’” and therefore the name had become (again) a “valid
trademark . . . entitled to protection as such”); cf. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 183
(1896) (finding that the name “Singer” had come “to indicate, in its primary sense, to the public, the class
and type of machines made by the Singer Company. . . and thus this name constituted their generic
description”).
202
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 1965) (holding
that plaintiff had “met its burden of proof on the issue of secondary meaning” and therefore had a
protectable trademark); cf. Goodyear’s Rubber Manuf’g Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 603
(1888) (holding that “Goodyear Rubber” is not “capable of exclusive appropriation” because it is
“descriptive of a class of good and therefore generic”).
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generic,203 even though the Eighth Circuit had held that it was a generic term just ten
years earlier.204
The “once generic, always generic” tenet of trademark law is problematic from an
economic perspective, as it effectively increases consumer search costs. If the “primary
significance” of a term in the commercial context is that of a source identifier, consumers
generally do not benefit when competitors are allowed to use the word generically.205 As
one commentator has observed, “[E]rroneously failing to protect the word when it in fact
serves as a source-identifying mark might be very costly if consumers end up confused
about a competing firm's product.”206

C. The Overbroad Scope of Evidence that Contributes to a Trademark’s
Demise
Perhaps because the “test” for identifying a generic term is such an elusive and
arguably arbitrary one, courts turn to various sources of circumstantial evidence to assist
them in making this determination. Such evidence typically includes dictionary
definitions of the word or words used in the mark; uses of the mark by and in the media;
and other types of non-competitive uses. We contend that this type of evidence is of little
203

Opryland U.S.A. Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 853 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also
Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Gilmore Entertainment Group, LLC, 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 942 (M.D. Tenn.
2002) (holding that plaintiff is “not collaterally estopped [by the 8th Circuit’s decision in Hilton, finding the
term ‘Opry” to be generic] from litigating the primary significance to the relevant public of the term ‘Opry’
today”).
204
WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984).
205
See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (acknowledging that
“[t]o determine that a trademark is generic and thus pitch it into the public domain is a fateful step” which
“may confuse consumers who continue to associate the trademark with the owner’s brand”).
206
Bone, supra note 49, at 2123. Professor Bone contends that, in this type of scenario, the cost of a “false
negative error”—a ruling that errantly denies trademark protection—is much higher than the cost of a
“false positive error,” a ruling that errantly grants trademark protection. Id. As a result, Professor Bone
reasons that, from the perspective of avoiding error cost, “a rule that reduces the frequency of false
negatives even as it increases the frequency of false positives is likely to be superior. . ., as long as the latter
effect is not too great.” Id.
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value in enabling the court to answer what should be the core question in any genericism
determination: whether the mark is functioning as a source-identifier in the relevant
commercial context. At best, it demonstrates that the word or term is or may be
functioning as a hybrid trademark, while shedding little light on which understanding of
the term constitutes its “primary significance” to the consumer in a commercial context.
Moreover, the current doctrine’s insistence that trademark holders “police” against
noncompetitive, noninfringing uses of their marks leads to overly aggressive trademark
enforcement activities, which are inefficient and, perhaps more importantly, may have the
undesirable effect of stifling the public’s ability to use language as it sees fit.

1. Problems created by trademark policing
As noted above, under the current genericide doctrine, uses of a mark by
dictionaries, yellow pages, newspapers, and other non-competing sources reflecting
public understanding of a term are used to demonstrate that a term is generic rather than
source identifying.207 Though mark holders can and should diligently police their marks
against competitive misuse, mark holders cannot (and, we argue, should not) try to stop
dictionaries, yellow pages, newspapers, and other non-competing third parties from using
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See, e.g., Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grotanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 809 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing dictionary
definition of “hog” as evidence that “hog” is a generic term); Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal
Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing use of the term “Filipino yellow pages” in a Los
Angeles Times article and in the dictionary as evidence of the term’s genericness); Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc.
v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing dictionary definition of “warehouse” as
evidence that “Shoe Warehouse” and “Warehouse Shoes” are generic terms); Miller Brewing Co. v.
G.Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing definition of “light” and the “misspelled
equivalent” as evidence that “lite” is a generic term); Retail Services, Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d.
535, 544-545 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing dictionary definition of “freebie” as evidence that it is a generic term);
cf. Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 407 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the absence of a
dictionary definition for “Smart power” is not conclusive evidence that the term is not generic).
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words that are trademarks in ways other than as a mark.208 This behavior constitutes fair
use of the mark and should be encouraged, not discouraged, by the courts. Furthermore,
as discussed above, the nature of language is such that people will adapt words as they
see fit209 and trademarks used in their expressive capacity constitute a public good that
we wish to encourage rather than suppress.
Therefore, the question arises as to why the case law insists that mark holders
must “police” their marks in these contexts. After all, one person’s policing is another
person’s harassment, or worse, abusive trademark litigation.210 There are costs to
engaging in these types of policing strategies, both from the standpoint of the trademark
holder and of the public.
2. The cost of policing from the perspective of the trademark holder
Through various means trademark holders strive to maintain their marks’ sourceidentifying qualities, and for good reason. The Lanham Act specifies that failure to do so
results in the death of the mark: “A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’. . . [w]hen
any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission,
causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection
with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.”211 Trademark
holders who do not pursue infringers may be contributing to the death of their marks via
genericide. As one court has explained, “Without question, distinctiveness can be lost by
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2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:28; accord Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d
244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996).
209
See notes 50-54 and accompanying text, supra.
210
See generally Greene, supra note 9. As discussed below, although there is not currently a doctrine of
trademark misuse, Judge Posner has recognized that a copyright holder using litigation to gain rights she
does not have is engaging in abuse of process. See Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC, v. Wiredata,
Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
211
See 15 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added).
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failing to take action against infringers. If there are numerous products in the marketplace
bearing the alleged mark, purchasers may learn to ignore the ‘mark’ as a source
identification. When that occurs, the conduct of the former holder, by failing to police its
mark, can be said to have caused the mark to lose its significance as a mark.”212
Unchallenged use of a mark by competitors understandably contributes to the
genericide of a mark. To refer back to our grocery store example, if all the teriyaki
sauces on the shelf are labeled soy vays and the maker of the “real” Soy Vay® does not
object, the brand loses its source-identifying significance. Soy Vay no longer signals the
consumer that she is buying a particular type of sauce with a hefty kick of ginger; instead
it merely tells her that she is buying teriyaki sauce. Therefore, the courts’ insistence on
the mark holder’s duty to police the mark in this context makes sense. As noted above,
however, courts consider much more than this type of evidence in determining whether a
mark holder has “abandoned” her mark and hence contributed to its death via genericide.
Although mark holders have no legal right to dictate the manner in which
newspapers and dictionaries utilize and portray their marks, they are expected to expend
resources in this quixotic and potentially harmful endeavor. Judge Posner writes:
A serious trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince
dictionary editors, magazine and newspaper editors, journalists and
columnists, judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to
avoid using his trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked
good or service.213
Yet, use of a trademark as a common noun or verb, in a noncommercial context, does not
have the same direct impact on a mark’s source-identifying capacity as does an infringing
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Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982); accord
Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rossner v.
CBS, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
213
Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 246.
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use by the trademark holder’s competitor. Such noncommercial uses typically indicate
that the mark in functioning in a hybrid function (a fate that is practically inevitable for
the most famous trademarks). Very few people decide how to use a word by first
consulting the dictionary or by blindly mimicking the way a reporter used the word in
Newsweek or The New York Times. Dictionary entries and media uses certainly may
reflect some of the ways in which a term is used. These noncommercial uses of a
trademark are, however, poor barometers of the consumer’s perception of the mark in
commercial contexts and – unlike competitive misuse of the mark – they do not
necessarily affect consumer perceptions in commercial settings. Thus, with our
understanding that people will use language as they see fit, it is inefficient to require
trademark holders to engage in the cat-herding endeavor of “policing” these types of
noncommercial uses.214
Nonetheless, trademark holders—particularly those who own “famous” marks—
have taken Judge Posner’s advice and often pursue expensive “education” strategies to
combat noncommercial “misuse” of their marks.215 Xerox, for example, engaged in a
massive advertising campaign to educate consumers about the “proper” use of its mark.
One such advertisement depicts a graveyard of trademarks, including escalator,
trampoline, cube steak, lanolin, dry ice, raisin bran, nylon, mimeograph, shredded wheat,
yo-yo, kerosene, cornflakes, and high octane.216 At the top of the ad, copy reads in bold,
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See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1354 (noting that these types of policing efforts are
inefficient in that they do not “stimulate demand for a firm’s product”).
215
On this point Professors Folsom and Teply conclude that the need to engage in these types of policing
efforts may signal the mark’s drift from trademark to generic term. In other words, according to Folsom
and Teply, such actions signal that the term is already losing its strength as a mark, and a court should
consider the necessity of such policing efforts as a sign of that decline. Id.
216
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Jessica Litman, and Mary L. Kelvin, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 317 (3d ed. 2001).
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“Once a trademark, not always a trademark.”217 Under that lead, the copy tells the tale of
the dead trademarks: “They were once proud trademarks, now they’re just names. They
failed to take precautions that would have helped them have a long and prosperous
life.”218 The copy then seeks the reader’s help to keep Xerox from suffering this fate by
asking the reader to use Xerox as an adjective, never as a verb or noun.219 This concern is
not only one for Xerox or a recent phenomenon; Kodak sponsored a similar advertising
campaign in 1920,220 and many others have engaged in analogous efforts.221
In addition to noncommercial uses, courts may also consider the existence of
other commercial, yet non-infringing, uses of the same or a similar mark to be evidence
that a word or term is generic.222 For example, in Filipino Yellow Pages, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, on summary judgment, that the mark “Filipino
Yellow Pages”—as applied to an advertisers’ phone directory marketed to the FilipinoAmerican community in California—was generic, not descriptive, based partly on
evidence that the mark holder “did not bring suit to challenge the marketing of . . . a
second Filipino Yellow Pages to the Filipino-American community on the East Coast.”223
It seems fairly clear that, if such a suit had been brought, it would have been unsuccessful
217

Id.
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 319.
221
See id. at 319-328 (showing advertising combating genericism sponsored by Weight Watchers®;
Tabasco®; Realtor®; Kimberly-Clark Corporation’s Kleenex®; Huggies®; Depends®; Freedom®;
Delsey® and Kotex® brands; Bacardi®; Plexiglass®; Levi’s®; American Express®; and Rolls-Royce®).
222
See, e.g. Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (use of a term “by
third parties in trademark registrations” may be considered evidence of term’s genericness); Van Well
Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1331 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (evidence of public
understanding of a term may be obtained from “any competent source,” including third parties’ use of the
term); March Madness Athletic Ass’n, LLC v. Netfire, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(finding that “the frequent use of March Madness for events and phenomena having nothing to do with
basketball also raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MMA has a protectable right to the
phrase”; citing use of “March Madness” in conjunction with “legislative activity, polka festivals, and sales
or specials on cars, furniture, and electronic equipment” as examples).;
223
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999).
218
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if not downright frivolous. Paper phone directories are targeted to a local audience, for
obvious reasons; very few people in New York City need to use the Los Angeles phone
directory. Therefore, little to no likelihood of confusion arises when two phone
directories, on opposite Coasts, use the same name. Trademark holders should not be
encouraged or pressured to bring frivolous lawsuits.224
In any event, it is unclear why non-competing third-party uses of the same or a
similar name should be considered relevant to a determination that a given name is
generic. As discussed above, a truly generic term has no source-identifying significance
and therefore is an unlikely and unwise choice for a brand name. Descriptive names,
however, can act as source identifiers, through acquired distinctiveness; are protectable as
trademarks under the Lanham Act if they have acquired distinctiveness; and have the
added benefit of telling the public about the attributes of the good or service to which
they are attached.225 Commercial uses of the same or similar marks in noninfringing
contexts—sometimes referred to as “third party uses” of the mark—are and should be
considered evidence that the term is descriptive rather than inherently distinctive,226 but
such uses do not prove and should not even suggest that the term is generic.
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Cf. What-A-Burger, VA v. Whataburger Corp. Christi, TX, 357 F.3d 44, 448-521 (4th Cir. 2004)
(affirmative defenses of laches and acquiescence did not apply, despite junior user’s unchallenged use of
the mark for 32 years, because such use was not likely infringing due to geographic distance between
markets of junior and senior user); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th
Cir.1996) (trademark owner has “no obligation to sue” until likelihood of confusion is imminent).
225
Descriptive marks are the weakest type of protectable mark. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text,
supra. Some commentators argue, for various reasons, that descriptive terms, like generic ones, should not
be protectable as trademarks. See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment,
70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing that extending trademark protection to descriptive marks violates
the First Amendment).
226
See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 793 (5th Cir. 1983)
(characterizing “the extent to which a term actually has been used by others marketing a similar service or
product” as the “final barometer of the descriptiveness of a particular term”); see also Vision Center v.
Opticks, Inc., 506 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing widespread use of “vision center” by optical stores
across the nation as evidence of the term’s descriptiveness); Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investing Banking
Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing evidence that eighty competitors used the word “invest”

66

- -

The genericide doctrine’s focus on noncommercial, noninfringing uses diverts the
trademark holder’s attention away from brand building and other activities that may
enhance the mark’s capacity as a source identifier. 227 Instead, it pressures them to
expend money and goodwill on quixotic endeavors ranging from “education campaigns”
designed to change the way the public uses the English language, to frivolous threats of
litigation or lawsuits aimed at noninfringing or fair uses of their marks.228 This aspect of
the genericide doctrine harms not only trademark holders, but also those who become the
targets of the hyper-enforcement activities that result. Any type of weak or, at worst,
frivolous litigation (or threat of litigation) is costly and should be discouraged or
sanctioned, not encouraged, by legal doctrine.

3. The negative effect of trademark policing on the public’s right to
use trademarks expressively
As noted previously, many valid trademarks—particularly the most famous ones—
can and do function expressively.229 In other words, even though a trademark may
function as a source-identifier in a commercial context, it may have other meanings and
uses as well. It should not be surprising that “hybrid” trademarks exist. After all, few

in their trademarks as evidence that “investacorp” is descriptive); King-Size, Inc. v. Frank’s King Size
Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp 1138, 1155 (D.C. Tex. 1982) (noting widespread use of “king size” to refer to
large clothing and shoes as evidence that the term is descriptive); cf. Blendco, Inc. v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,
132 Fed Appx. 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the term “Better-N-Butter” to be suggestive, where only
two other companies had used the term to describe a “nondairy butter-flavored oil”) (unpublished);
Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Security
Center” used in reference to business that houses private storage vaults found suggestive when only twelve
out of 105 members of the relevant trade association used the term to describe similar services).
227
See Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1354; see also id. (contending that the need to engage in these
types of policing efforts may signal that the term is losing its strength as a mark, and that courts should
consider the necessity of such policing efforts as a sign of that decline).
228
Accord Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d at 647 (acknowledging that copyright owners using litigation as a
method of obtaining rights beyond the scope of copyright engage in an abuse of process)
229
See notes 50-54 and accompanying text, supra.
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words have only one meaning. For example, the word “snow” is defined as (1)
“precipitation in the form of . . . white ice crystals”; (2) “a dessert made of stiffly beaten
whites of eggs, sugar, and fruit pulp”; (3) cocaine or heroin; or (4) “to deceive, persuade,
or charm glibly.”230 Even though definitions 2-4 are fairly clearly derived from the first
definition of the word “snow,” their existence does not undermine or call into question
the validity of the word “snow” as it refers to fluffy, white, frozen precipitation. We
determine the meaning of the word by the context in which it is used. Despite trademark
holders’ best efforts to the contrary, a trademark is much like any other word, and
therefore its meaning and use—depending on the context—will evolve over time.231
The law recognizes and protects the expressive use of trademarks under the doctrine
of fair use. The Lanham Act provides that if a trademark is used “otherwise than as a
mark,” then such use is not actionable.232 Therefore, if a trademark is being used
expressively—not as a source identifier—then such use is not actionable by the
trademark holder. The Act’s recognition and protection of fair use directly reflects a core
principal of trademark law: trademarks are not held “in gross.”233 The public has a right
to use trademarks in this manner.
As discussed above, the genericide doctrine’s characterization of noncommercial,
noninfringing uses of a trademark as evidence that the mark has become generic
incentivizes trademark holders (directly and indirectly) to “police” these types of uses.
While the “education campaigns” discussed above may be viewed as relatively harmless
230

WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1117 (1983).
See Clankie, supra note 56, at 262 (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general,
unmanageable.”).
232
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2005).
233
See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a trade-mark
confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the
protection of one’s good-will in trade. . . .”); accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
413-14 (1916).
231
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(except to the extent that the cost of such campaigns is passed along to the consumer),
other trademark policing efforts have a more direct and negative effect on consumers.
Frivolous lawsuits are the most obvious example of this type of behavior; however, most
trademark holders do not have to resort to such measures. Typically, just the threat of
litigation (even when ever so lightly implied) by a corporate giant is sufficient to dissuade
a person from making fair use of a trademark.234 Although trademark law does not
recognize the doctrine of trademark misuse,235 Judge Posner has recognized the
possibility of abusive litigation or “misuse” in the copyright context. The same reasoning
applies to trademark law. To paraphrase Judge Posner, “[a trademark] owner[’s] use
[of]] an infringement suit to obtain property protection … that [trademark] law clearly
does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an
abuse of process.”236
One Web site, Chilling Effects (www.chillingeffects.org) maintains a growing
database of more than 1700 cease and desist letters covering the full range of intellectual
property law. These cease and desist letters demonstrate that trademark holders often
threaten to sue in cases which—at least in the eyes of a person familiar with trademark
law—would be demonstrably frivolous. These trademark holders often claim a fear of
234

Of course, sometimes such policing efforts have the opposite effect. Online lexicographer Paul
McFedries, after receiving letters from Google requesting that he recognize Google as a trademark, chose
to note Google as a trademark while listing evidence of generic uses of the term, including uses in the
Chicago Tribune, The Denver Post, and the Telegraph-Herald. Furthermore, the site links to Google
derived words and phrases, such as Google bombing, Googlejuice, and Googleverse, as well as noting
some use the term “google” to mean to search for anything at all. See WordSpy at
http://www.wordspy.com/words/google.asp (last visited April 3, 2006). WordSpy is a lexicography Web
site “devoted to lexpionage, the sleuthing of new words and phrases. These aren't ‘stunt words’ or
‘sniglets,’ but new terms that have appeared multiple times in newspapers, magazines, books, Web sites,
and other recorded sources.” Wordspy Home Page, http://www.wordspy.com/ (last visited April 3, 2006).
235
See Association of American Medical Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp.2d 11, 18-19
(D.D.C. 2004); Juno Online Services, L.P., v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp 684. 690 (N. D. Ill. 1997).
236
Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d at 647.
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genericism as the driving force behind such threats. The Lego Group’s letter to the
operator of a Lego fan site, located at “www.ratemylego.com” and
“www.ratemylegos.com,” is an example.

237

The letter informs the fan that “our

trademarks must never be used descriptively or generically (i.e., Legos), but must always
be used as an adjective followed by a descriptive noun (e.g., LEGO® toys) and must
never be combined with other words (with or without a hyphen) to form a new word.”238
The letter then claims that the fan’s registration of the www.ratemylego.com and
www.ratemylegos.com domain names constitutes trademark infringement, and then
requests that he “immediately and permanently cease” using the domain names, and that
he agree never to register them again.

239

Lego’s Fair Play policy, a “Legal Notice”

regarding its intellectual property rights posted on the Lego Web site, specifies that “[t]he
Lego trademark cannot be used in an Internet address,” on the theory that doing so would
create the “misleading impression that the LEGO Group sponsored the homepage.”240
Moreover, the Fair Play policy “insists” that “the LEGO logo NEVER be used on an
unofficial web site,” regardless of context.241

237

Posting of Leggo that Domain Name to,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003). Another Lego related
letter may be found at Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=517.
238
Posting of Leggo that Domain Name to
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003). Other letters with
similar rationales include ones from Wiley Publishing, Inc. regarding its For Dummies series: “If the mark
is used by too many different sources, it becomes a ‘generic’ term, and Wiley may lose its exclusive right
to use it.” Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/protest/notice.cgi?NoticeID=355 (Jul. 15, 2002).
Sun MicroSystem’s letter regarding its Java mark provides another example: “Like all trademarks, ‘Java’
should not be used as a noun, but instead should be used as an adjective. Please use an appropriate generic
descriptor, for example, ‘technology,’ after each Java based trademark.” Chilling Effects,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=231.
239
Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003).
240
Lego.com, Fair Play, Please, http://www.lego.com/eng/info/default.asp?page=fairplay&bhcp=1 (last
visited Jun. 1, 2006).
241
Id. (emphasis in original).
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In this case, the former fan242 was not infringing the Lego trademark, as he was not
using the mark “as a mark”—his use of the mark would almost certainly be characterized
as a nominative fair use.

243

Moreover, because he was not selling anything or competing

with Lego in any way on the site, he probably was not “using” the mark at all, as “use”
has been defined under the Lanham Act.244 The Lego Group undoubtedly knows that it
does not have an absolute right to control when and how its trademark is used in the
context of a domain name or a Web site, yet it attempts to suppress all such uses, at least
in part due to concerns about genericide.245 This behavior inhibits speech that should be
encouraged and protected by the Lanham Act.

D. The Dilution Connection
One other unfortunate side effect of the current version of the genericide
doctrine—particularly its emphasis on noninfringing, noncommercial uses of trademarks
as evidence of genericism—has been the expansion and legitimation of the oft242

Lego’s policing efforts in this case prompted the once-enthusiastic Lego fan to create a link on the
www.ratemylego.com and www.ratemylegos.com domain names to a separate Web page denoted
“legogroupsucks.com” and “saynotolegos.com.” In it he argues that “companies who purposely use the
law to try to intimidate domain holders into surrendering their names under frivolous claims are un-ethical.
[ ] These people have no trouble alienating their fans for the sake of profit. Sadly I contributed to the
revenue of the company and thus indirectly to the salaries of the lawyers who now try to take my domain.
Instead of spending the past week having fun and building my lego toys, I am forced to waste my time
protesting the company who makes the toys I love. For these reasons, Lego group sucks; along with all the
other companies who try to bully good-faith domain holders out of their names.” Lego Sucks,
http://legogroupsucks.com/ (Jan. 2, 2004).
243
The Ninth Circuit recognized the nominative fair use doctrine in New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that a
newspaper did not infringe the New Kids on the Block trademark by conducting a telephone poll inviting
readers to vote for their favorite New Kid. Id. at 307-09.
244
See Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-680(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
www.bosleymedical.com, a Web site highly critical of the mark owner, did not infringe or dilute the
BOSLEY MEDICAL trademark, because it did not constitute commercial use of the mark).
245
The Lego Group’s Fair Play policy and cease-and-desist letter may also be interpreted to reveal a
broader agenda of claiming rights “in gross” to its trademark, divorced from any legitimate concern about
genericide. See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1032 (noting that, when acting under a property-based conception
of trademark rights, trademark holders “seek out and punish virtually any use of an intellectual property
right by another”).
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criticized246 dilution doctrine. Even though genericide is a relatively rare (though not
always unsuccessful) basis for a dilution claim, 247 in reality it is inherently linked to the
justification for the existence of a dilution cause of action.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) accords the holder of a “famous”248
trademark the right to enjoin a commercial use of its mark that “causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark.”249 “Dilution” is defined as “the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence
or absence of (1) competition between the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”250 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
“[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not
the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in

246

See, e.g., Klieger, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Selchow & Richter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1977)
(upholding district court’s finding of irreparable injury based on theory that defendant’s use of “Scrabble”
in “The Complete Scrabble Dictionary” could render plaintiff’s mark generic); Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v.
Kalvin, 619 F. Supp. 849, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“[t]he anti-dilution statute in no way restricts the right to
advertise a claim that one’s product is as good as a better known brand but one may not do it in a way that
risks turning the latter into a generic term”); Norton Co. v. Newage Industries Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
382, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14289 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (use of the words “Tygon-type tubing” in defendant’s
promotional materials infringed plaintiff’s Tygon mark and constituted unfair competition because such use
was “calculated or likely to cause [plaintiff’s] mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin”); cf.
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting theory of dilution that would allow mark
owners to enjoin mark usage solely because such use may “threaten to render the mark generic”);
Diversified Marketing, Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting
argument that advertising slogan, “If You Like ESTEE LAUDER. . . You’ll Love Beauty USA” diluted
Estee Lauder mark by tending to make it generic); see generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining
Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 558-66 (1991) (criticizing theory of dilution by genericide).
248
See note 31, supra.
249
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that,
according to the legislative history, the FTDA is designed to “to protect famous trademarks from
subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion”) (internal citation omitted).
250
15 U.S.C. § 1127. The FTDA was enacted in 1995; however, dilution has existed as a state law cause of
action for many years. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330 (providing for injunctive relief upon a
showing of “[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark. .
. notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services”).
247
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protecting consumers.”251 Dilution has been characterized as treading “very close to
granting rights in gross in a trademark.”252 The theory of dilution by blurring has been
explained as follows:
If one small user can blur the sharp focus of the famous mark to uniquely
signify one source, then another and another small user can and will do so.
Like being stung by a hundred bees, significant injury is caused by the
cumulative effect. . . . This is consistent with the classic view that the
injury caused by dilution is the gradual diminution or whittling away of
the value of the famous mark by blurring uses by others.253
When Congress enacted the FTDA, it cited “the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin,
and KODAK pianos” as examples of dilution that would be actionable under the
statute.254
If one “whittles away” at a stick for an extended period of time, the stick will
ultimately be reduced to a pile of wood shavings. Similarly, at least in theory, the result
of a persistent course of dilution will be the genericide or disappearance of the trademark.
Even though genericide is not commonly stated as a specific ground for a dilution
claim,255 the two doctrines are therefore inextricably linked, at least in the mind of the
trademark holder. When attempting to “police” a trademark, some mark holders tend to
conflate the two concepts, as amply illustrated by this language from a cease-and-desist
letter:
In short, this trademark is an extremely valuable asset of our company and we
want to protect it against dilution. For your information, dilution is a relatively
new area of law, which requires the owner of a trademark to protect it against
"erosion" and/or dilution. Some famous examples of trademark dilution are
251

Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
253
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, §
24:94); see also General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
254
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 1030 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1030.
255
See note 247, supra.
252
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Kleenex tissues, Xeroxing, Scotch Tape and Aspirin, as these marks were not
protected by their respective owners and today have become almost generic terms.
256
[O]ur goal is to prevent such ‘generalization’ from happening to our trademarks.
Both genericide and dilution are driven, at least in part, by the idea that uses of a
mark in noncommercial257 and/or noninfringing contexts necessarily deplete the mark’s
ability to function as a source identifier, and/or constitute evidence that the mark has lost
its source-identifying significance. As explained both above and below, we believe that
this effect has been overstated, and moreover that the cost of preventing or “policing”
against such uses exceeds any benefit that is derived from it.

IV.

A Modest Proposal to Reform the Genericism Doctrine

As explained above, we contend that the current version of the genericism
doctrine is inherently flawed and requires reform. The following section presents our
proposal for a revised understanding and implementation of the doctrine, one which we
believes more effectively balances the rights of trademark holders and the public, and
which better reflects the core purposes of trademark law: (1) protection against consumer
confusion, and (2) preservation and optimization of efficiency and competition.
We argue that the genericism doctrine’s primary focus should shift from the
elusive genus/species distinction to the question of whether the putative mark is
functioning as a source identifier in the context of the relevant marketplace. If it is not
256

http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=149; see also IDG letter to UCO Lick
Observatory, http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=474 (using same language).
257
While uses of a mark in noncommercial settings (e.g., by the media or dictionaries) may arguably dilute
the distinctive qualities of a mark, they are not actionable, as the FTDA applies only to “commercial use in
commerce” of a mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), and it recognizes the affirmative defense of fair use for
“noncommercial use” of the mark, use by the news media, and use in comparative advertising. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C).
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serving its intended purpose, then it can and should be characterized as “generic”—it is
not functioning as a trademark. If the word or term is functioning as a trademark—i.e., a
source-identifier—then the court should examine whether extending trademark protection
to the word or term would have an unacceptable impact on competition. If so, then
regardless of whether the mark has acquired distinctiveness, it should be deemed generic
and hence unprotectable. Such a system would better protect the rights and interests of
both trademark holders and the public.

A.

The Consumer Perspective: Interpreting Primary Significance and
Secondary Meaning

The first step in determining whether a putative trademark is “generic” should be
to determine whether it acts as a source identifier in the relevant commercial context. In
other words, is it distinctive, or (in the case of arguably descriptive terms) has it acquired
secondary meaning? If the answer is “no,” then the term cannot be a trademark. As
Judge Learned Hand stated in the Bayer case:
The single question. . . in all these cases, is merely one of fact: What do
the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are
contending? If they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then. . .
it makes no difference whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to get
them to understand more. He has failed . . . .258
Terms that do not satisfy this basic purpose should not be protected as trademarks.
Absent an unacceptable impact on competition, however, those that do serve this function
should be treated as marks.
258

Id. at 509.
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As discussed earlier, current doctrine holds that, if a term denotes a product class
(i.e., a genus), then it is “generic” even if it is functioning as a source identifier. In such
cases, the term is said to have acquired only “de facto” secondary meaning, and hence
cannot be protected as a trademark.259 As at least one court has recognized (although it
was reversed), the idea that a term can be declared “generic” even though its “primary
significance” in the minds of the consuming public is that of a source identifier is
somewhat illogical:
If the acid test of a symbol's capacity to differentiate is public perception,
then the process of labeling for purposes of protectability cannot be
undertaken without reference to that perception. [ ] To label a word or
logo ‘generic’ in the face of the admitted presence of secondary meaning
is to assert that every word has some absolute, inherently correct
characterization that the law will discern without regard to what the public
may think the word means.260
The modern concept of “de facto” secondary meaning is also inconsistent with the
original understanding of genericism, as derived from the common law of unfair
competition. This body of law protected words or phrases that were not considered
technical trademarks from infringement, but only if they had acquired distinctiveness, or
secondary meaning.261 Under the common law, the key question was whether the term at
issue had acquired secondary meaning—in other words, whether its “primary
significance” to the consumer had become that of a source identifier; if it had not, the
term was not entitled to protection from infringement.262 In other words, at least with
regard to terms that were not arbitrary or fanciful, the questions of genericism (i.e.,
unprotectability) and secondary meaning were not separately analyzed; they were
259

See note 188 and accompanying text, supra.
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906-07 (D.R.I. 1980); rev’d, 655 F.2d
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effectively one and the same. For all of these reasons, we argue that modern courts
should also turn their attention to “secondary meaning” or distinctiveness as the first step
in determining the “primary significance” of a given term.

1.

The problem of the hybrid mark

When, as was the case in Bayer, the court determines that the consuming public
ascribes no source-identifying significance to the term at issue, the inquiry is a relatively
simple one: the term is not a trademark. However, most cases are not so easy. As
discussed previously, trademarks (at least the most famous ones) are like most words, in
that they typically have more than one meaning. These “hybrid terms,” as Folsom and
Teply have described them, “perform a variety of informational functions—ranging from
the provision of pure commercial or source-related information to the provision of pure
generic or product-category information—at the same time.”263 In other words, different
consumers may understand a trademark to mean different things, and/or a single
consumer may apply multiples meanings to the same trademark, depending on the
context in which it is used.264 When determining whether a term is generic, the court
should focus on the “primary significance” of the term to the consumer in a commercial
context, and should give little weight to evidence of uses outside that context.265
We argue that the all-or-nothing approach, which suggests that consumers take a
term to signify primarily either a source or, if not a source, a product class, fails to
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Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1339.
Id.
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This statement is not to say that expressive uses do not impact language and potentially the trademark
itself. Rather, as discussed below, those uses and impacts are better addressed under a competition analysis.
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capture the way in which terms actually function. In fact, the “primary significance” to
the consumer shifts depending on the context in which the term is used. In other words,
the fact that the public may use trademarks in a non-trademark manner does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that such uses harm the trademark and/or the policies
of increasing economic efficiency and consumer protection that lie at the core of classic
trademark doctrine.266 Moreover, these other, “expressive” uses of trademarks have
inherent value, and the public’s right and ability to use trademarks in such ways should
not be stymied or quashed, as is often the case today.267
For example, KLEENEX is a trademark that is widely considered to be borderline
generic. Yet, even though this mark has a widely-understood “generic” meaning that is
arguably the “primary significance” of the term, there is evidence that it also functions as
a source identifier, in the proper context. Consider that a person with a cold can walk
into a colleague’s office, ask for a “kleenex” and be handed a tissue but not a Kleenex®brand tissue. At that moment the person with the runny nose is likely to accept the tissue
offered without complaining or caring about the brand. When that same person is in a
supermarket, however, she may certainly care whether she buys Kleenex® versus Puffs®
brand facial tissue, due to her experience with the brands’ relative softness or thickness.
Indeed, she might be confused if a box of facial tissue were labeled “Puffs Kleenex.”
The key question should be whether consumers still perceive KLEENEX as a sourceidentifier in the marketplace, not whether they use “kleenex” as a common noun (as they
undoubtedly do), in other settings.
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See notes 229-245 and accompanying text, supra.
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For similar reasons, the traditional notion that the trademark holder should never
use her mark as a noun or verb, but only as an adjective with a generic term appended to
the mark,268 takes an overly constrictive view of the ways in which the public uses
language. Although many familiar marketing campaigns, such as “Do you Yahoo!?” and
“Dude, you’re getting a Dell,” arguably use the respective marks improperly, they do not
appear to have morphed these marks into generic terms. For example, the “Dude, you’re
getting a Dell” campaign has the word computer implied in the statement, but has not
resulted in consumers saying “Get a Dell” when they really mean to get a Compaq, a
Gateway, or some other computer.269 Thus, although these trademarks have been used in
ways that traditionally have been seen as contributing to genericism, that use has not
confused the public or limited other competitors’ ability to enter the market. Marketers
have simply chosen to reflect the way in which people tend to speak.
Some argue that allowing a company to keep using hybrid terms such as
KLEENEX as trademarks harms consumers and increases search costs.270 This argument
can be best understood as a question of the information available to the consumer. In
theory, experience goods such as toothpaste, mouthwash, clothing, and so on do not pose
a problem when generic terms are used as trademarks because the consumer will engage
in the experience at relatively low cost—271e.g., purchase toothpaste, try it out, and
possibly try another maker’s toothpaste and another’s until she finds the one she likes. In
268

For example, the International Trademark Association explicitly instructs trademark owners not to use
trademarks as nouns or verb and to always use the trademark with a generic term to avoid possible
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Id. at 1342.
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addition, these products are sold in stores where pre-purchase comparison is facilitated
because the consumer can read labels, examine packaging, and even try the product.272
When a consumer shops for more expensive and/or less-frequently purchased
goods (such as a several thousand dollar motorcycle), however, the concern is that the
information available when shopping for experience goods is not as easily available and
as such consumers “face either enhanced risks in purchasing the possible substitute or
increased search costs, unless there is a readily available, reliable means of determining
whether competing products possess the functional attributes associated with the
trademarked word.”273 In other words, an uniformed or unsophisticated consumer will be
likely to over rely on the trademarked generic term and purchase only the mark holder’s
product rather than a competitor’s equally good product because the consumer will wish
to stick with the product bearing the generic term she knows.274
The frequency with which a consumer will be without “readily available, reliable
means of determining whether competing products possess the functional attributes
associated with the trademarked word”275 may, however, be diminishing. Given the
greater availability of information to the consumer from all sides—the Internet,
television, trade and consumer comparison magazines, the marketer who pursues all these
avenues as well as employs packaging and placement tactics in stores, and consumer
awareness of substitute generic products for brand products—consumers are less likely to
be unarmed as they shop for goods and more likely to be able to use a brand name
generically in common speech but as a source-identifier when consuming. As such, the
272
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issue raised in allowing one company to claim a term as its trademark is better addressed
by focusing on the way language evolves and whether the term is necessary for
competition.

2. The doctrine should recognize and reflect that the meaning of words
evolves over time

As described above, most words have more than one meaning, and those
meanings can and will change over time. A word or term which has no secondary
meaning may acquire it; a word which has abundant secondary meaning may lose it all.
The current doctrine, however, largely fails to reflect the fluidity of language. Under the
“once generic, always generic” theory, courts refuse to recognize as trademarks sourceidentifying terms—even arbitrary ones—that may have been “generic” at some point in
their life cycle as part of the English language. The doctrine should not attempt to freeze
the “primary significance” of a word at a given point in time, as to do so is both artificial
and inefficient.
As previously discussed, several courts have held that, if a word or term was used
generically in the past (usually based on a dictionary definition or some similar source), it
cannot ever become a valid trademark, at least when the term retains any shred of generic
meaning.276 However, this approach deviates from the core question of whether the term
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is functioning as a source-identifier in the relevant commercial context and, therefore,
renders potentially inefficient results. For that reason, it should be abandoned.
When a court deems a term generic, based on an understanding of the term that is
not or is no longer shared by most consumers, such a decision imposes higher search
costs on the consumer . In other words, when courts ignore or refuse to recognize the
“primary significance” of the term in the relevant market, inefficiencies result. The
Harley-Davidson v. Grottanelli277 case is a prime example. There, rather than allow
consumers to maintain their predominant use of “Hog” as meaning a particular type of
Harley-Davidson motorcycle, the court held that anyone could use the term to mean large
motorcycles, based on dictionary definitions and reports in the media that were published
twenty to fifty years earlier.278 As a result of this decision, consumers may have been
required to distinguish between Honda Hogs and Harley Hogs, and would likely wonder
whether Harley-Davidson had entered into joint ventures with those manufacturers.
Absent competitive necessity, as discussed in the following section, courts should avoid
increasing consumer search costs and thus undermining the efficiency that is ideally
embodied in trademarks.

B.

The Doctrine Must Focus on Competition

Once the court has determined that a term has source-identifying significance, the
court should look to the question of whether according trademark protection to that term
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Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
See note 191 and accompanying text, supra.
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would have an unacceptable impact on competition. If so, then the term should be
deemed generic, regardless of its source-identifying properties:
Underlying the genericness doctrine is the principle that some terms so directly
signify the nature of the product that interests of competition demand that other
producers be able to use them even if terms have or might become identified with
a source and so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary meaning.279
If there is only one word or term that the public understands as signifying the product,
even if they have come to associate that name with a single source, the trademark holder
should not be able to erect a barrier to entry into the marketplace by preventing her
competitor from calling the product by its name. Therefore, the genericide doctrine must
address the question of when competition requires that a word or term be available for all
to use.
The inquiry that the court should undertake in addressing this question is
analogous to a determination of functionality in the context of trade dress law. Trade
dress (e.g., product packaging or design) may function as a source identifier, just like a
word mark.280 Functionality renders trade dress unprotectable, much in the same way
that genericism renders a word mark unprotectable. The Supreme Court has held that a
feature of trade dress is “functional” if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”281 More broadly, the Court has held that
a product feature is functional “if exclusive use of the feature [by the party claiming trade
dress protection] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
279

A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 308 (3d Cir. 1986); see also American Cynamid v.
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disadvantage.”282 This broader statement regarding the underlying purpose of the
functionality doctrine applies equally well in the genericism context: if granting one
person the exclusive use of a word or term to identify a good or service puts that person’s
competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,” then the courts should
not grant trademark protection to the term. In short, it should be considered generic.
In the trade dress context, many courts consider the existence of “alternative
designs” in analyzing the competitive necessity aspect of the functionality doctrine. If a
competitor can achieve the same utility as the product feature in question through an
alternative design, this fact tends to suggest that the feature is not “functional.” 283
Similarly, courts can and should consider the existence of alternative words to use as
source identifiers (or lack thereof) in determining whether “competitive necessity”
renders a word or term generic: “Whether the term that identifies the product is generic. .
. depends on the competitors' need to use it. At the least, if no commonly used alternative
effectively communicates the same functional information, the term that denotes the
product is generic.”284
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Smart producers and marketers already know that they have a duty to develop
generic alternatives to the trademarks that they attach to their goods and services,
particularly when they are in a position to achieve market dominance.285 Few companies
make the mistake that Bayer made in the early 1900’s, when it marketed its new drug
under the label “Aspirin,” without providing any viable alternative for the consumer to
identify the drug.286 Thus, TiVo calls its product a DVR. Kleenex makes facial tissues.
Xerox sells photocopiers.
Whether the public is willing to adopt the alternative generic term offered up by
the producer of the good or service depends in part on the amount of effort put into
promoting the alternative term and its linguistic desirability. For example, as is the case
with Xerox, TiVo, and Kleenex, assuming that these trademarks function as sourceidentifiers, the question is whether DVR, facial tissue, and photocopier are viable terms
to allow for competition.
While business owners who choose arbitrary or fanciful names for their products
may be aware of the need to choose a generic alternative, the need to do so when
choosing a seemingly descriptive name may be less obvious. In Canfield, for example,
the product name in question was Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda, a term which was found
generic.287 While a competitor could make a competing diet soda that also purports to
taste like chocolate fudge and give it a suggestive (“Diet Fudgilicious”), arbitrary
(“Purple”) or fanciful (“Zango”) name, using such names would impose a “significant
285
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non-reputation-related disadvantage” on the competitor. Unlike Diet Chocolate Fudge
Soda, these names (especially the fanciful and arbitrary ones) tell the consumer little to
nothing about the soda inside the can, and therefore the competitor would have to expend
considerable resources to educate the consumer about his product, unlike the holder of
the Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda mark.288 In Canfield, Judge Becker found the Diet
Chocolate Fudge Soda mark to be generic, because there was no acceptable alternative to
describe the product: “Flavors. . . have unique characteristics, and we can imagine no
term other than ‘chocolate fudge’ that communicates the same functional information,
namely, that this soda has the taste of chocolate fudge, a particular, full, rich chocolate
taste.”289
In short, the putative trademark holder who chooses a descriptive term to label his
good or service should weigh the issue of available alternatives just as much, if not more,
than if he had chosen an arbitrary or fanciful mark. The question that should be asked is
whether there is another way to describe the product that communicates its attributes just
as effectively and efficiently. If not, the business owner or marketer should choose a
different mark. Otherwise, the business owner risks a great deal in expending resources
to acquire secondary meaning that may ultimately be for naught.

C. The Solution in Action

Suppose that a few years from now iPod has been entered into dictionaries as
meaning any portable multimedia device, appeared in numerous newspaper and journal
288
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articles as a general term for a multimedia device, and has been otherwise used as shorthand for a portable multimedia device; all despite Apple’s best efforts to persuade
“lexicographically influential persons” that the term is Apple’s trademark and only
designates Apple’s portable multimedia device. At such a point, suppose further that
Walnut, a licensee of Apple’s iPod platform and maker of its own portable multimedia
device, mismanages its product line such that Apple—as it must, lest it fail to control the
quality of products associated with its mark and thus lose its trademark290—terminates
the license agreement. After the end of the relationship Walnut decides to continue
making its portable multimedia device using a different software platform but calling the
device Walnut’s iPod. Apple would have to bring suit to prevent this use and most likely
Walnut would defend itself in part by claiming that “iPod” had become generic.
At trial, evidence demonstrates that iPod is a hybrid term, i.e., some use the term
in a product-category manner, some in a source identifying manner, and some in a
combination of the previous two manners,291 and that the media has used the term
generically. Under these facts, despite the varying ways in which the term is used, a court
would have to find that either the term was generic or not. There is no available middle
ground. And, under these facts, a court would likely find that the term had become
generic; that “the trademark was initially an invented term and lost its protection because
of later public expropriation.”292
Under our proposed approach, however, a more rational inquiry would follow.
The court would first examine whether the term iPod had any source identifying qualities.
290
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If that inquiry failed to demonstrate that iPod retained any level of source identification,
the inquiry would end because, absent source-identification, the term is not functioning as
a trademark. If, however, source identification were found, the court would examine
whether the competitors required the term to enter and compete in the market. The
defendant would bear the burden of showing that there was no other commercially viable
way in which to refer to a given product.
Given that multimedia player or MMP are available alternative terms to iPod, a
court should rule that iPod was not necessary to facilitate competition. The analysis is the
same when considering descriptive terms that have acquired secondary meaning, such as
Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda. In cases of this sort, the trademark holder has chosen to use
terms that are more open to challenge on competitive necessity grounds. The trademark
may have acquired secondary meaning, but when the terms are the essence of the idea of
the product such that alternative terms are not available, the trademark will be ceded so
that competitors may enter the market fairly. This approach requires that trademark
holder choose marks carefully and deploy terms to allow competition. Yet that is a result
that we should foster. For, as Judge Hand noted, a trademark is not supposed to be a
monopoly eliminating competition; rather it is supposed to enhance the marketplace and
protect the consumer. As such, whoever seeks the benefits of trademark status must then
expend some resources to develop terms that also allow competition. Such a requirement
would add some small cost to the trademark beneficiary, but it is a task that fits easily
within the marketing department.293 Moreover, society will gain two terms rather than
one.294 More importantly, from an efficiency standpoint, it fosters competition and
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reduces the potential for long-term costs, such as enforcement campaigns of questionable
usefulness and the possibility that a competitor could invalidate the mark.

Conclusion

Current genericism doctrine requires an all-or-nothing, static approach to
understanding how a term functions in society. In analyzing whether a term is
protectable, courts traditionally look first to the term’s status: is it generic or not, i.e., is
its “primary significance” that of a product class (genus) or of a particular product
(species)? Courts often determine that significance by focusing on the way in which the
term is used in noncommercial, public contexts such as newspapers and dictionaries. We
disagree with this approach.
First, marks (at least the most famous ones) rarely function in a purely sourceidentifying manner. Rather, such marks tend to have a hybrid nature whereby they have
multiple meanings, often to the same person, depending on the context in which they are
used. To determine whether the term is functioning as a valid trademark, the courts
should focus on its “primary significance” in the commercial context, recognizing that
the term may have additional, “generic” meanings as well.
Second, the current doctrine’s approach, which relies on an overly broad scope of
evidence in deeming a trademark generic, forces irrational behaviors on the part of mark
holders in that they must expend resources trying to persuade the media, dictionaries, and
others from making fair use of their marks. Thus, mark holders waste resources trying to
influence actors over whom they have no right or ability to control (through “education,”
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bullying, and, in some cases, litigation), rather than spending those resources more
efficiently elsewhere and/or cutting the cost of their goods or services.
A rational genericide doctrine should focus on two basic questions, recognizing
that the answers to those questions may and likely will change as language evolves: (1)
(1) Does the mark function as a source identifier i.e., what is its primary significance in
the relevant marketplace?; and (2) Would protecting the term as a trademark impose a
“significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” on competitors? Such a doctrine would
strike a better balance between the significant interests that both trademark holders and
the public have in this fundamental struggle over the meaning and right to use language.
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